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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from the Third District Court's grant of a judgment to 
Plaintiff Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. ("Fairbourn"), against Defendant American 
Housing Partners, Inc. ("American") in the principal amount of $153,000.00 plus 
attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $45,001.00. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code Annotated. This 
appeal has been assigned to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. The trial court erred in finding that the phrase "evidence of financial 
capability to close" contained in the Purchase Agreement between Rochelle and 
American was ambiguous. A trial court's determination that a writing is ambiguous 
is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. West Valley City v. Majestic 
Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah 1991: Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P. 2d 1234, 
1251 (Utah 1998). 
II. If the Purchase Agreement is ambiguous, whether the trial court erred 
in holding that there was a meeting of the minds between American and Rochelle? 
A trial court's determination of whether an enforceable contract exists is a finding 
of fact that will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 
264, 266-67 (Utah 1987). 
III. Whether the trial court erred in its admission of parol evidence that 
contradicted the plain language of the Purchase Agreement rather than clarified the 
E \Laune\Amerhous\FairAppeal\AppellateBnef v2 wpd ' ^ y ^ ' 
Purchase Agreement? The trial court's admission of parol evidence is a question 
of law that is reviewed for correctness. Glauser Storage. L L C , v. Smedley. 2001 
Utah Ct. App. 141, U 14, 27 P.3d 565 (citations omitted). 
IV. Whether the trial court erred in holding the alleged ambiguity of the 
Purchase Agreement against American? The trial court's interpretation of common 
law is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 
P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992). 
V. If the Purchase Agreement is ambiguous, whether the trial court erred 
n construing the extrinsic evidence of the intent of American and Rochelle? The 
rial court's construction of an ambiguous contract based on extrinsic evidence is 
a question of fact that is reviewed under clearly- erroneous standard. West Valley 
:ity v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Craig 
:ood Industries. Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P. 2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
VI. Whether the trial court erred in failing to apply Utah law, as set forth in 
>proul v. Parks. 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 436 (Utah 1949), to the Purchase 
agreement regarding who is a ready, willing, and able buyer? A question of 
contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence [is a] matter of law" 
nd the appellate court accords "the trial court's interpretation no presumption of 
orrectness." Lee v. Barnes. 1999 UT Ct. App. 126, fl 7, 977 P.2d 550 (citations 
mitted). 
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VII. Whether the trial court erred in applying Utah law, as set forth in 
Bushnell Real Estate. Inc. v. Nielson. et al.. 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983), to the Listing 
Agreement's language that Fairboum's commission is due upon the closing of 
Rochelle sale? The trial court's determination of enforceability of a contract is a 
conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. Lee v. Barnes. 977 P.2d 550, 
552 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
VIII. Whether the trial court erred in not holding Fairbourn to the standard 
of a fiduciary with relation to American and denying the claims based thereon? The 
trial court's determination that Fairbourn breached no fiduciary duty is a mixed 
question of fact and law that is reviewed "de novo" with a grant of discretion to the 
trial court. C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules which pertain to 
this appeal are fully set forth in the addenda hereto where not fully set forth in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 28, 2000, Fairbourn filed a Complaint against American and 
Armando J. Alvarez alleging breach of a Listing Agreement against both American 
and Mr. Alvarez and breach of broker standards (including treble damages) and 
tortious interference with economic relations against Mr. Alvarez. On April 5, 2000, 
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American and Mr. Alvarez filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was 
denied by the trial court on June 14, 2000. On August 6 and 7, 2001, the trial court 
held a bench trial. On August 29, 2001, the trial court heard oral argument on 
pre-trial and post-trial briefs.1 On October 29, 2001, the trial court entered a 
Memorandum Decision which incorporated the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court granted 
Fairboum's claim for commission against American but denied its claims against 
Mr. Alvarez. On November 9, 2001, Fairbourn filed a Motion to Modify Findings of 
cact and Conclusions of Law seeking to increase the principal amount awarded 
rairbourn. On November 28, 2001, the trial court entered a Judgment which was 
amended and restated in a subsequent Judgment entered by the trial court on 
December 28, 2001. On January 11, 2002, American filed a Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In early 1999, Armando Alvarez ("Mr. Alvarez") approached James Fairbourn 
"Mr. Fairbourn") of Plaintiff Fairbourn Commercial Inc. ("Fairbourn"), a real estate 
>rokerage, for assistance in selling a parcel of real property located in West Jordan, 
Jtah (the "Property"). (R. 231; T. 53-54.) Mr. Alvarez was acting on behalf of 
)efendant American Housing Partners, Inc. ("American"). (R. 231; T. 9.) 
American was wholly owned by Mr. Alvarez's brother, Sergio Alvarez. (R. 
31; T. 9.) American had entered into an agreement to buy the Property from its 
1The record of this oral argument was inadvertently not recorded. 
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owners, the Coons. (R. 231; T. 39-41.) At the time that Alvarez began his 
conversations with Mr. Fairbourn, American had encountered considerable 
obstacles in gaining the approvals from the city of West Jordan necessary to 
develop the Property. (R. 231-2; T. 48-54.) These problems placed American's 
purchase agreement with the Coons in peril. (R. 232; T. 82-87.) 
During the first seven months of 1999, American pressed ahead on three 
fronts: the effort to gain municipal approval of its development plan; the effort to 
preserve the purchase agreement with the Coons; and the effort to find a buyer for 
the Property who would pay the Coons' selling price, put some money in American's 
pocket, and free American from its entanglements with West Jordan officials. (R. 
232; T. 38-87.) Mr. Fairbourn and Fairbourn were enlisted to aid American in the 
third undertaking. (R. 232-33.) Mr. Fairbourn proposed that American seek a buyer 
for the Property marketed as "paper lots" - lots which had received plat approval 
but which had not been improved. (R. 232; T. 53-54, 171-72, 306-07.) 
The pressure on American to act mounted in late July 1999 when the Coons 
notified American that they were "ending and terminating any and all agreements" 
relating to the Property because American had failed to close. (R. 232; T. 82-83.) 
In late August 1999, the Coons agreed to reinstate their contract of sale with 
American through December 1, 1999. (R. 232; T. 85.) As American worked to 
salvage the deal with the Coons it scored a success with West Jordan when it 
persuaded the city to approve the necessary zoning for the Property if American 
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would acquire an adjacent parcel of property owned by an opponent of American's 
proposed development. (R. 232; T. 217.) 
In this uncertain setting, Fairbourn moved ahead with the performance of its 
task. (R. 232.) Through a contact with real estate agent Marshall Larson ("Mr. 
Larson"), later to become employed by Fairbourn, Fairbourn learned of a potential 
buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. ("Rochelle"). (R. 232-3; T. 309-10.) Rochelle was 
an affiliate of Liberty Homes, a residential home builder in the Salt Lake City area. 
(R. 233; T. 219, 310.) 
In early August 1999, Rochelle made a preliminary proposal to buy the 
Property. (R. 233; R. 411, Ex. No. 1; T. 55-56.) Rochelle's proposal, presented in 
:he form of "an official notice of intent" letter, led to a meeting among 
•epresentatives of American, Rochelle, and Fairbourn. (R. 233; T. 57-60.) 
Numerous elements of possible transactions were discussed at the meeting, 
ncluding a remark by Mr. Alvarez that any deal must include a provision concerning 
he buyer's ability to perform. (R. 233; T. 59-60, 311-12.) Mr. Fairbourn, who 
attended the meeting, was aware of the exigent circumstances in which American 
ound itself and recognized that American had a legitimate interest in securing a 
>uyer who could be counted on to perform. (R. 233; T. 312.) 
On August 13,1999, Rochelle made an offer to buy the Property. (R. 233; 
*. 410, Ex. No. 2; T. 62.) The offer was presented through a preprinted Real Estate 
^rchase Contract and a handwritten addendum. (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 1.) It 
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was accompanied by a Single Party Listing and Sale Agreement (the "Listing 
Agreement") which obligated American to pay Fairbourn a $1,500.00 per lot 
commission if Rochelle bought the Property for $2,277,000.00 cash. (R. 233; R. 
410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) The Listing Agreement indicates 
that the Property contained "approx (sic) 99 undeveloped lots." (R. 233; R. 410, 
Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) 
The Listing Agreement also states that Fairbourn is to procure an offer from 
Rochelle "at the price and upon the terms set forth herein" and "upon any other 
terms or conditions acceptable to" American. (R. 410; R. 410, Ex. No. 3.; 
Addendum "C" attached hereto.) The Listing Agreement further states that 
American's payment of commissions to Fairbourn is due "as soon as sale or 
exchange of said property is consummated" and " shall be due and payable at 
closing." (R. 410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) 
American rejected Rochelle's offer because it was inconsistent with what was 
discussed at the prior meeting. (R. 233; T. 62, 312.) Rochelle presented a second 
offer several days later which was met with a counteroffer. (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 
5; T. 63-64; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) American's counteroffer was 
presented in typewritten form and incorporated the terms of Rochelle's second offer 
while adding several new provisions. (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" 
attached hereto.) Among the new provisions was a term titled "Financial 
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Capability." (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) This term 
stated: 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement 
by both parties, buyer shall supply to seller with evidence 
of financial capability to close on the Property within the 
time frame reference above. In the event Buyer is unable 
to provide said evidence, Seller shall at its sole option 
cancel this Agreement and neither party shall have any 
further obligation to the other. 
(R. 234; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) 
Mr. Alvarez inserted the Financial Capability term into the counteroffer 
because under the terms of the proposed sale Rochelle's duty to perform was not 
contingent on its acquisition of financing pursuant to paragraph two of the Purchase 
Contract; therefore he wanted evidence of Rochelle's ability to perform. (R. 234; 
R. 410, Ex. No. 5; T. 225-27; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) While the printed 
contract provision regarding financing, when elected, excuses the buyer's duty to 
Derform if he is unable to obtain financing under the specified terms, the buyer is 
equired pursuant to paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract to make timely 
application for financing. (R. 234; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached 
lereto.) If financing is unavailable on the terms agreed to in the Purchase Contract, 
j buyer may nevertheless insist that the seller perform by "providing Seller with 
absolute assurance" that the proceeds required to close the sale are available. (R. 
>.34; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) Mr. Alvarez believed that 
he Financial Capability term inserted into the counteroffer would serve as a 
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substitute for these "buyer's undertakings" which did not apply to Rochelle because 
it did not elect to make its purchase contingent on financing. (R. 234; R. 225-27.) 
The parties met on August 30,1999, the day the counteroffer was accepted. 
(R. 234; T. 88-90.) At the meeting they reviewed the terms of the sale and made 
several changes to the counteroffer by interlineation. (R. 234; T. 90.) Before they 
entered into the sales contract for the purchase of the Property for a purchase price 
of $2,272,000, the Financial Capability clause was discussed at the meeting. (R. 
234; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; T. 89, 318-19; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) American 
expected Rochelle to provide evidence of cash on hand, an existing line of credit 
available to fund the purchase, a loan commitment, or similar proof of Rochelle's 
ability to fund the purchase. (T. 77, 100-02, 224-25.) Mr. Larson, a real estate 
agent then employed by Fairbourn, who represented Rochelle under the terms of 
a dual agency agreement, believed that Mr. Alvarez intended to require a letter from 
Rochelle's bank in the form of an unofficial loan commitment. (R. 234-5; T. 400, 
418.) 
On or about September 10,1999, Rochelle provided American with a letter 
from First Security Bank ("First Security") which stated that First Security "would not 
expect having difficulty making acquisition and development loans in the future" 
regarding Rochelle but noting that "[a]n acquisition and development loan would be 
subject to committee approval." (R. 235; R. 410, Ex. No. 7; Addendum "D" attached 
hereto.) Prior to receipt of this letter American did not know that Rochelle intended 
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to fund the purchase price from a future loan, although Mr. Larson representing 
Rochelledid. (T. 195.) 
American rejected the First Security letter as insufficient evidence of financial 
capability to close, because the funding was conditioned upon approval of a loan 
from First Security. (R. 235; T. 168-70.) Mr. Alvarez had previous experience with 
First Security declining to make a loan after obtaining assurances of financing 
without having first received a commitment. (T. 169-70.) As a result of further 
communication between American and Fairboum, Mr. Larson then asked First 
Security to issue a binding loan commitment for the benefit of Rochelle. (T. 248, 
252-55.) Rochelle then provided American a second letter, dated September 17, 
1999, from First Security which made reference to existing lines of credit (none of 
/vhich were available for acquisition and development of lots) and stated that an "A 
& D loan is considered on it's [sic] own merits" and that a loan "would be contingent 
jpon the acquisition and development loan receiving committee approval." (R. 410, 
Ex. No. 11; T. 239; Addendum "E" attached hereto.) Again the letter did not specify 
hat Rochelle could obtain a loan, that it could do so on its own account or that it 
;ould do it within the prescribed time frame. (R. 410, Ex. No. 11; T. 239; Addendum 
E" attached hereto.) 
On September 21,1999, finding the second First Security letter unacceptable 
is evidence of financial capability to close due to the contingency of committee 
ipproval, American canceled the Purchase Agreement with Rochelle in writing. (R. 
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236; R. 410, Ex. No. 12.) Rochelle then reclaimed its earnest money deposit. (T. 
283.) 
Cy Simon ("Mr. Simon"), an employee of First Security, testified that loans to 
Liberty and various Rochelle entities were all guaranteed by each other and its 
principals because the bank was insecure about relying only upon one entity. (T. 
232-34.) In the process of preparing the First Security letters and even though he 
never spoke with Mr. Alvarez, he was asked to provide an absolute loan 
commitment but he stated that he could not provide a binding commitment for the 
bank. (T. 248.) Providing a loan to Rochelle would be contingent upon factors 
such as the economy, creditworthiness, interest rates, and the supply and demand 
for lots. (R. 236; T. 236-38.) Lines of credit mentioned in the September 17,1999 
First Security letter were not available to Rochelle or for acquisition of the Property. 
(T. 249.) 
When advised of the termination, Mr. Fairbourn apologized to Alvarez and 
made no objection about the loss of the sale or a commission. (T. 186-87,194.) 
Mr. Fairbourn acknowledged in his deposition, which was read into the record at 
trial, that "we never did establish if Rochelle could perform or not." (T. 373-74.) Mr. 
Larsen testified that he was embarrassed because his buyer could not perform. (T. 
455-56.) Alvarez testified that he did not terminate the Purchase Agreement 
because of any ill will to Mr. Larson or Mr. Fairbourn. (T. 196.) Mr. Fairbourn 
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concluded at his deposition, which was read into the record at trial, that American 
had not acted in bad faith in terminating the Purchase Agreement. (T. 361-62.) 
American eventually sold the Property to Leon Peterson. (T. 127.) American 
did not commence negotiation with Mr. Peterson until after termination of the 
Purchase Agreement with Rochelle, and it was not an incentive for American to 
terminate the Purchase Agreement. (R. 493-94.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in finding that the language of Paragraph 3 of the 
Purchase Agreement between Rochelle and American that required Rochelle to 
Droduce evidence within fourteen days of the execution of the Purchase Agreement 
Df its financial capability to close the purchase was ambiguous. The language 
•egarding the financial capability of Rochelle as contained in Paragraph 3 of the 
Purchase Agreement has a plain and usual meaning and has been defined in case 
aw in this jurisdiction as well as others. Pursuant to its plain meaning and 
applicable case law, Rochelle was not a "capable" and/or "able" buyer. Fairboum 
toes not claim an alternative definition of Paragraph 3 but the trial court 
levertheless rewrote it. 
Rochelle and American had vastly differing views of what was required to 
establish financial capability and consequently Rochelle and American did not have 
i meeting of the minds regarding an essential and material element of the 
Purchase Agreement. If Paragraph 3 is ambiguous, the trial court erred in its 
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admission of parol evidence that contradicted Paragraph 3 rather than clarified it. 
If the language of Paragraph 3 is ambiguous, the trial court erred in holding such 
ambiguity against American as the drafter of the same. If Paragraph 3 is 
ambiguous regarding the "evidence of financial capability to close," the trial court 
erred in construing the parol evidence regarding the intent of American and 
Rochelle when entering into the Purchase Agreement. 
The trial court erred in determining that American failed to communicate to 
Rochelle its expectations of the evidence of Rochelle's financial capability that it 
would find satisfactory. It also erred in failing to impute the knowledge of Rochelle's 
agent, Mr. Larson, to Rochelle regarding what evidence of Rochelle's financial 
ability to close Rochelle needed to provide American to satisfy Paragraph 3. 
The trial court erred in failing to find that Fairbourn had met its contractual 
duties under the Listing Agreement to provide American a ready, willing and able 
buyer pursuant to Utah law as set forth in Sproul v. Parks. 116 Utah 368, 210 P. 2d 
436 Utah (1949). The trial court also erred in failing to hold that the plain language 
of the Listing Agreement requires that Fairbourn's commission was due upon the 
closing of the Rochelle sale. Fairbourn breached its fiduciary duties to American 
as its real estate broker thereby precluding its recovery of commission from 
American. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
TERM "EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL CAPABILITY TO CLOSE" 
CONTAINED IN THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT. 
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the language of the Purchase 
Agreement between Rochelle and American that required Rochelle to produce 
evidence within fourteen days of the execution of the Purchase Agreement of its 
financial capability to close the purchase. The trial court ruled that such language 
was ambiguous, admitted parol evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties, held 
the ambiguity against American as the drafter of the same, and further held that 
American failed to clarify the ambiguity when Rochelle requested clarification. (R. 
231-40; Addendum "A" attached hereto.) 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Finding That the Phrase "Evidence 
of Financial Capability to Close" is Ambiguous. 
i. Legal Standard. 
The trial court erred in finding that the phrase "evidence of financial capability 
o close" contained in the Purchase Agreement between Rochelle and American 
vas ambiguous. A trial court's determination that a writing is ambiguous is a 
conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. West Valley City v. Majestic 
nvestmentCo.. 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah 1991): Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P. 2d 1234, 
251 (Utah 1998). 
"The primary rule in interpreting a contract is to determine what the parties 
itended by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, 
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giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears 
v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982). "A contract is considered 
ambiguous if the words used to express the meaning and intention of the parties 
are insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach two or more 
plausible meanings." C. J. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (citations omitted). "[A] contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous just 
because one party gives that provision a different meaning than another party does 
[, t]o demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be 
tenable." R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 
(Utah 1997) (citations omitted). "Where a contract is plain and unambiguous, it 
does not become ambiguous by reason of the fact that in its operation it will work 
hardship upon one of the parties thereto and a corresponding advantage to the 
other." 17A Am. Jur. 2D Contracts § 338. 
If the language of a contract "is clear and is not susceptible of more than one 
interpretation, the ordinary plain meaning of the words must be used." Bryant v. 
Desert News Publishing Co.. 120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951). "The 
contract must be looked at realistically in the light of the circumstances under which 
it was entered into, and if the intent of the parties can be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty it must be given effect." Maw v. Noble. 10 Utah 2d 440,443, 
354 P.2d 121,123(1960). In Maw the Utah Supreme Court held that though the 
contract in question was silent on an issue, the parties were subject to the effects 
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of the language of the contract "which would reasonably and naturally follow." IcL 
at 123. Parol "evidence cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the plain 
language of the contract." Commercial BIdg. Corp. v. Blair. 565 P.2d 776, 778 
(Utah 1977). In Commercial, the Utah Supreme Court overturned a district court's 
construction of contract language where it required "the substitution of the word 'or' 
for the'word 'and.'" Id. In so ruling, the Court stated "[a]ll words used by the parties 
must, if possible, be given their usual and ordinary meaning and effect." ig\ 
ii. The Purchase Agreement Language is Not 
Ambiguous. 
Paragraph 3 of the Counter-Offer to the Purchase Agreement, that was 
ncorporated into the final Purchase Agreement, states as follows: 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both 
parties, [Rochelle] shall supply [American] with evidence of financial 
capability to close on the Property within the time frame referenced 
above [14 days from final plat plan approval by the City of West 
Jordan]. In the event [Rochelle] is unable to provide said evidence, 
[American] shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and neither 
party shall have any further obligation to the other. 
R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) (Hereinafter this paragraph 
thai! be referred to as "Paragraph 3"). 
There are therefore three (3) elements required by the plain language of 
'aragraph 3: (1) within fourteen days of execution of the Agreement; (2) Rochelle 
5 required to supply American; (3) with evidence of its financial capability to close 
•n the Property by paying $2,277,000 within fourteen days of final plat plan 
pproval. The primary financial obligation imposed upon Rochelle at closing as 
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defined by the Purchase Agreement is the payment of $2,277,000. (R. 410, Ex. No. 
5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) There is no ambiguity in this requirement. The 
plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in Paragraph 3 require evidence 
within fourteen (14) days, that Rochelle was capable of paying this contract amount. 
The terms "capable" and/or "able" are not subject to ambiguity. Merriam Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary (Tenth Edition 1998) defines "capability" as the quality or state 
of being "capable" which is in turn defined as "having legal right to own, enjoy, or 
perform." Thus Rochelle needed to provide evidence within fourteen days of 
execution of the Purchase Agreement of its legal right (ability) to financially perform 
under the Purchase Agreement within fourteen days from final site plan approval. 
iii. Rochelle was not a "Capable" and/or "Able" 
Buyer. 
The language regarding the financial capability of Rochelle as contained in 
Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement has been defined in case law in this 
jurisdiction as well as others. Pursuant to applicable case law, Rochelle was not 
a "capable" and/or "able" buyer. 
In the matter of Winkelman v. Allen. 519 P.2d 1377 (Kan. 1974), the Kansas 
Supreme Court overturned a jury verdict in favor of a broker seeking recovery of 
commission for producing a "ready, willing and able buyer" because the proposed 
purchaser's financial ability to perform did not meet the definition of an "able" buyer. 
After a review of the law in numerous jurisdictions, the Kansas Supreme Court 
concluded that the degree of proof required to show financial capability of an "able" 
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that the term "command" is important, the court stated the "cases uiiilurmly hold 
that the purchaser cannot show ability hv depending upon third persons in no way 
bound lw liimr.h lund1." U .il I'-1" l< iltln >i ... . . • 
of Minnes^u m Shell Oil Co. v. Kapler. 235 Mim. - ' • " ' A 
court quoted with approval the following as an excellent discussion of a buyer's 
financial ability in connection with a real estate transaction: 
Generally speaking, a purchaser is financially ready and able to buy: 
(1) If he has the needed cash in hand, or (2) if he is personally 
possessed of assets—which in pad mav consist of the property to be 
•••.,»
 :i^sed-~and a credit rating _•!•::;•.•!• ; vith reasonable 
; itv to command the requisite funds at the required time, or (3) if 
he has definitely arranged to raise the necessary money-or as much 
thereof as he is unable to supply personally-by obtaining a binding 
commitment for a loan to him for that purpose by a financially able third 
party, irrespective of whether such loan be secured in part by the 
property to be purchased. . . . [I]t is clear—in the light of the purpose 
of the rule—that where the purchaser relies primarily, not upon his own 
personal assets, but upon the process of a contemplated loan or loans 
to be made to him by a third party, he is financially able to buy only if 
he has a definite and binding commitment from such third party loaner. 
Even though the third party is financially able, his promise is of no 
avail unless made for an adequate consideration. 
d. at I38 r (quoting Shell Oil \' ~'.'-1,<u. tomiihasis .added), See also Potter v. 
-iidge Kea.i> corporation. . . •• • ,-.O\D A.2d "^B M969). 
i >• , ipr.'iriP Spruul 
'^Parks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 43b ^Uah 1949) «• , •• • hrnk-i 
isserted a claim for commission against the owners of real property under the 
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terms of a listing agreement. The listing agreement provided for the payment of a 
commission to the broker if he was to find a buyer who is ready, able, and willing 
to buy. i d at 437. The Utah Supreme Court concluded from the buyer's testimony 
that the buyer intended to obtain funds for the purchase of the property out of the 
proceeds of the sale of his own property, i d at 438. The Court stated: 
Even if defendants had been presented with a written acceptance of 
their counter-offer within the listing period, which never occurred, they 
would be entitled to assume that the purchaser then was financially 
able to perform, not that he might become able sometime in the future. 
The provisions in the broker's listing contract obligates the owner to 
pay a commission if a sale is procured or a purchaser is procured who 
is ready, able and willing to perform. That does not mean a purchaser 
who will not be ready for some time nor one who must sell his home 
first. 
] d (emphasis added) (citing Cottingham v. Smith. 28 Cal.App.2d 345,82 P.2d 479 
and Willis v. Page. 19 Cal.App.2d 508, 65 P.2d 944 (1937)). 
In the case at hand, the evidence is undisputed that Rochelle intended to 
obtain a loan from which it would satisfy the balance of the purchase price at the 
closing of the purchase. (R. 234; Addendum "A" attached hereto at page 4.) As 
evidenced by the two letters prepared by First Security, Rochelle could not 
demonstrate within the initial 14 days of the Purchase Agreement a current ability 
to close the purchase but was dependent upon a non-binding expression of 
willingness from First Security that sometime in the future, it might make a loan to 
Rochelle to purchase the Property, dependent upon numerous factors. (R. 410, Ex. 
Nos. 7 and 11; Addenda "D" and "E" attached hereto.) 
E \Laune\Amerhous\FairAppeal\AppellateBnef v2 wpd Page 25 
JusUis llieie was in.) Iinuiiiiij i oiniiiilnniiil lui d loan IIOIII I- nsl Security, there 
was in • • '•- - -
entities to guaranty a loan to Rjciieilt; (J ou.iUitici, lo i .ist Secuntyb IUC- ui 
other evidence that Rochelle was financial -"-'-!.-."«,_, ..,,; ' .aseH. r-,,..
 t. .. ... 
5 ..». vailabilu ' " ^ n n 0 . uy Koch^,,-: . 
not demonstrate t.icu » < • \ -
demonstrated a future contingent ability to purchase the I . ~,—y. 
J..;*.•. ;•». , ir«?«n agreei M:. obligation was to provide an "able" buyer, 
substance or resource to close was not present within fourteen (14) d \^/Q nf the 
:ontract and American did not bargain to wait months for a closing to deten ~ ..« 
tiesence. 
The trial court's construction ol lln • won I i ;iii;ihlo rommcis lli.il IIH.1 Idiiuudik1 
)e interpreted to mean it is a "probable" or "likely" event and rewrites the conucuA 
ather * .nterprets the contract by its plain meaning. Rochelle was not a 
capab>' i icil i lo I > 11,' • • 111 * 111 riii I * 11111 i i. 11 • • 11 HII I MM I use Agreement in 
jood faith, and Fairbourn is therefor not entitled to commissions. 
iv. Fairbourn Does not Claim an Alternative 
Definition of Paragraph 3 but the Court 
Nevertheless Rewrote it. 
Fairbourn did nnl ;w;\\u< ;w\ .illniidlivi .It finiliuii M| I \nagraph 3 beloie IIn 
rial court, but asserted that the term "evidence of financial capability to closo" w.r. 
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ambiguous because the Purchase Agreement did not further "define that term or 
the scope thereof." (R. at 125.) Fairboum further argued that in any event, the two 
letters provided by First Security were sufficient to meet the requirement of the 
ambiguous language and that American's termination of the Purchase Agreement 
for Rochelle's failure to provide the same was in bad faith. (R. at 125-28, 173-75.) 
By contending that the two First Security letters meet the necessary proof of 
financial capability, Fairbourn necessarily argues that the "likelihood of future loan 
approval" is sufficient evidence of present (14 day) capability. Thus Paragraph 3 
is rewritten by both Fairbourn and the trial court to read as follows: 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both 
parties, [Rochelle] shall supply [American] with evidence of [a 
likelihood of obtaining future loan proceeds sufficient] financial 
capability to close on the Property within the time frame referenced 
above [14 days from final plat plan approval by the City of West 
Jordan]. 
Read in this manner, proof of present capability and proof of a likelihood of 
obtaining a future loan have significantly different and conflicting meanings. The 
likelihood of closing a loan in the future, conditioned upon the satisfaction of 
conditions, is not the same as proof, within 14 days, of the capability to pay 
$2,277,000 at closing. By inclusion of the terms "likelihood" or similar terms such 
as "probable" or "more likely than not" the Court rewrote Paragraph 3 and nullified 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the parties' agreement. 
Such an argument is the same as made in Commercial where the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that parol evidence cannot "vary or contradict" the plain 
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B If Paragraph 3 is Ambiguous, the Trial Court Erred in 
Construing the Ambiguity. 
i 1 he 1 rial Court Erred in Failing to Hold That 
rhere Was no Meeting of the Minds 
Between American and Rochelle Regarding 
the Purchase Agreement. 
The-; h briefed by American, the trial court did not rule in ib Memorandum 
lecisioin whether ; there was a meeting of the minds between American and 
Rochelle - • v -1^ . 
f Paragraph ;J is indeed ambiguous, IJIUIU io Evidence thai Rouiei.* :~ s 
lad vasii. a id ing views of what ^/as requlu- f V; establish financial capab 
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746 P.2d 264, 266-67 (Utah 1987). In overturning such a ruling by a trial court this 
Court must find that the evidence is insufficient "viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's construction." West Valley City at 1313. In order 
to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of the evidence, 
the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings." 
Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993). In marshaling the 
evidence, the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial." Moon v. Moon. 973 
P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). After constructing this array of competent 
evidence, the challenging party "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence . . . 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City at 1315. 
If after parties enter into a contract, "circumstances disclosed a latent 
ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word by which one of the parties meant 
one thing and the other a different thing, the difference going to the essence of the 
supposed contract, the result is that there is no contract." 17A Am. Jur. 2D 
Contracts § 31. In Davies. after detailed review of contract negotiation, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has previously upheld a finding there was no meeting of minds 
regarding the contract price "[g]iven the disparity in the testimony regarding the 
contract price." Davies at 267. "[A]n honest difference of understanding as to what 
the contract was is fatal to reformation, for in such case there is no meeting of the 
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Mr. Gardner testified that his understanding of Paragraph 3 was that Rochelle 
would provide a letter from its bank discussing the banking relationship, what 
banking lines Rochelle had, and how much business Rochelle had done with the 
bank. (T. 289-90.) Mr. Gardner further testified that he believed the initial letter 
provided by First Security satisfied the requirements of Paragraph 3. (T. 293.) 
In contrast, Mr. Alvarez testified that he expected that Rochelle would provide 
cash, a line of credit, a letter of credit or its equivalent to satisfy Paragraph 3. (T. 
77,167-68.) Mr. Alvarez based this belief on Rochelle's purchase of the Property 
not being contingent upon financing and his need to see current ability. (T. 225-27.) 
As noted above, American and Rochelle had extremely different 
understandings of what Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement required. The trial 
court found credible Mr. Clark's testimony regarding Rochelle's inability to provide 
cash, a loan commitment or a letter of credit with fourteen days of execution of the 
Purchase Agreement, as he cites the same in his Memorandum Decision as a 
basis or his ruling.2 (R. 235; Addendum "A" attached hereto at page 5.) The trial 
court however disregarded the testimony of Mr. Alvarez where he indicated he had 
a vastly different understanding of the requirements of the Listing Agreement. 
The fatal flaw in the trial court's finding is that although Rochelle was unable 
to provide evidence of its financial capability in the form of proof of available cash, 
2
 It is this finding of the Court that confirms that American was justified in 
terminating the Agreement. Rochelle could not provide the evidence required by 
Paragraph 3. 
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\l The Trial Court Erred in its Admission of 
Parol Evidence That Contradicted the Plain 
Language of Paragraph 3 of the Purchase 
Agreement. 
If Paragraph 3 is ambiguous, the trial court erred in its admission of parol 
evidence that contradicted Paragraph 3 rather than clarified it. The trial court's 
admission of parol evidence is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
Glauser Storage. L L C , v. Smedley. 2001 Utah Ct. App. 141, If 14, 27 P.3d 565 
(citations omitted). 
If an integrated contract is found to be ambiguous, parol evidence may be 
admissible "only in the very limited situations where it is needed to clarify—not 
contradict—any ambiguous terms in the agreement." i d at U 21 n. 2. (emphasis in 
original) (citing Hall v. Process Instruments & Control. Inc.. 890 P.2d 1024,1026 
(Utah 1995). "Parol evidence not inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show 
what the entire contract really was, by supplementing, as distinguished from 
contradicting, the writing." Webb v. R.O.A. Gen.. Inc.. 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (emphasis in original) (quoting Stangerv. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co.. 
669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983)). Though parol evidence may be admitted to 
show the intent of the parties if contract language is vague or uncertain, "such 
evidence cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the plain language of the 
contract" and all words used in a contract must "be given their usual and ordinary 
meaning and effect." Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair. 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 
1977) (citations omitted). 
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of money readily available to actually close the sale such as cash on hand, a line 
of credit, a letter of credit, a binding loan commitment, or other evidence to the 
same. All of the parol evidence allowed by the trial court would render Paragraph 
3 void and force American to wait until closing before it would know if Rochelle 
could perform. American clearly bargained to receive within 14 days evidence that 
Rochelle could perform within fourteen days and the trial court's consideration of 
parol evidence and its subsequent ruling nullifies this provision. 
Though the trial court was correct in finding testimony credible that a binding 
loan commitment could not be obtained within fourteen days, it's finding that a party 
cannot obtain proof that it has available cash, a line of credit, a letter of credit, 
sufficient assets to secure a loan, or other evidence within fourteen days is incorrect 
on its face and contradicts reason, logic and the language of Paragraph 3. (R. 235; 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto at page 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) 
If Rochelle had cash available in an account at its bank, it could have 
produced evidence of those available funds. If Rochelle had an existing line of 
credit it could use to purchase the Property, it could have produced evidence of 
such line of credit within fourteen days. If Rochelle had other assets available or 
if its bank could issue a letter of credit, it could have produced evidence of the 
same, easily within fourteen days. It is precisely this type of evidence of current 
financial ability to close that American expected to receive within fourteen days of 
execution of the Purchase Agreement. (T. 77, 100, 102, 105, 167-68, 225-27.) 
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a written attorney fee agreement was subsequently modified by an oral agreement 
between the parties. Jones Waldo at 1372-73. In construing the oral agreement 
against the attorney, the Court of Appeals stated that it "is the general rule that in 
construing a contract between attorney and client, doubts are resolved against the 
attorney and the construction adopted which is favorable to the client" and that 
"because of the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship, compensation 
agreements made during the existence of that relationship are closely scrutinized 
and construed most strongly against the attorney." Jd at 1372 (citations omitted). 
In Simonsen. the Utah Supreme Court held that a release drafted solely by an 
insurer contained ambiguous language regarding release of both medical and 
property damage claims when the insured had previously refused to sign a release 
unless it was limited to only her property damage claims. Simonsen at 1002. In so 
ruling, the Court stated that a general release "must at a minimum be 
unambiguous, explicit, and unequivocal." igl (citations omitted). 
In the case at hand, the Purchase Agreement was heavily negotiated by both 
Rochelle and American with both parties drafting language contained in the final 
version of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 233-34; Exhibit "A" attached hereto at 
pages 3-4.) This case is similar to the facts of Nunn v. Chemical Waste 
Management. Inc.. 856 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) where the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that any ambiguity in a business acquisition agreement would not be 
held against the drafter because the "rule that contracts are to be construed against 
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favorable to the trial court's construction." West Valley City at 1313. As noted in 
Section I. B. i above, the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings." Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 
1993). 
In this matter, the trial court heard testimony from six witnesses. Mr. Alvarez 
testified on behalf of American, Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson testified on behalf of 
Fairbourn, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner testified on behalf of Rochelle, and Mr. Simon 
testified on behalf of First Security. (Mr. Alvarez T. 8-229; Mr. Fairbourn T. 303-
390; Mr. Larson T. 390-468; Mr. Clark T. 259-285; Mr. Gardner T. 286-302; Mr. 
Simon T. 229-258.) 
Both Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson had a financial interest in the outcome of 
this action as agents of Fairbourn. (T. 306-09; 436-37.) Fairbourn represented 
both Rochelle and American as set forth in the dual Listing Agreement. (T. 315; R. 
410, Ex. No. 3; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) 
Testimony regarding the intent of the parties regarding Rochelle's evidence 
of financial capability to close varied broadly during the course of the bench trial. 
The testimonies of Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner were all 
fairly consistent, with the testimony of Mr. Alvarez sharply contradictory. Mr. 
Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Gardner testified that Mr. Alvarez had 
requested proof of Rochelle's ability to perform during their meetings. (T. 312-19; 
T. 404-18; T. 262-63; T. 289-92.) However, Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, 
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and Mr. Gardner testified that Mr. Alvarez made no requests for cash, a binding 
oan commitment, or a letter of credit during their meetings. (T. 318-19; T. 404; T. 
>63; T. 289-90.) Mr. Clark testified that it would have been impossible to have 
)roduced anything too strong financially within two weeks of signing the Purchase 
\greement. (T. 264.) Mr. Clark testified that Mr. Alvarez indicated during the 
\ugust 1999 meeting that all he needed was a letter from a lender that stated it was 
nore likely than not that Rochelle would receive a loan. (T. 268-69.) Mr. Fairbourn, 
/lr. Larson, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Gardner thought that the first letter provided by First 
Security was more than sufficient to meet the evidence of proof of financial 
apability to close as required by the Development Agreement. (T. 320; T. 420; T. 
73; T. 293.) Mr. Fairbourn's testimony at trial was contradicted by his earlier 
eposition which was read into the record that "we never did establish if Rochelle 
ould perform or not." (T. 373-74.) Mr. Fairbourn further testified that American did 
ot have an obligation to negotiate after the fourteen day period. (T. 375.) Mr. 
Jardner did not include language regarding proof of Rochelle's financial ability to 
lose in the first draft of the contract proposed to American because he did not think 
was a key point of the deal. (T. 292.) Mr. Larson testified that it was clear during 
le discussions in the August 1999 meeting that Rochelle would be borrowing 
loney to fund the purchase. (T. 402-03.) 
All of the witnesses involved with the negotiations of the Purchase Agreement 
greed that American was in a precarious situation regarding the Property subject 
aune\Amerhous\FairAppeal\AppellateBnef v2 wpd Page 40 
to the Purchase Agreement and wished to be able to close quickly with a 
dependable buyer. (T. 53-75; T. 306-10; T. 400-01; T. 261-63; T. 289.) The trial 
court's memorandum decision accurately characterizes this evidence: 
American had entered into an agreement to buy the West 
Jordan property from its owners, the Coons. At the time that Mr. 
Alvarez began his conversations with Mr. Fairbourn, American had 
encountered considerable obstacles in gaining the approvals from the 
city of West Jordan necessary to develop the property. These 
problems placed American's purchase agreement with the Coons in 
peril. 
During the first seven months of 1999, American pressed ahead 
on three fronts: the effort to gain municipal approval of its development 
plan; the effort to preserve the purchase agreement with the Coons; 
and the effort to find a buyer for the property who would pay the 
Coons' selling price, put some money in American's pocket, and free 
American from its entanglements with West Jordan officials. Mr. 
Fairbourn and his company were enlisted to aid American in the third 
undertaking. He proposed that American seek a buyer for the property 
marketed as "paper lots" -- lots which had received plat approval but 
which had not been improved. 
The pressure on American to act mounted in late July 1999 
when the Coons notified American that it was "ending and terminating 
any and all agreements" relating to the property because American 
had failed to close. In late August 1999, the Coons agreed to reinstate 
its contract of sale with American through December 1, 1999. As 
American worked to salvage the deal with the Coons it scored a 
success with West Jordan when it persuaded the city to approve the 
necessary zoning for the property if American would acquire an 
adjacent parcel of property owned by an opponent of American's 
proposed development. 
In this uncertain setting, Fairbourn moved ahead with the 
performance of its task. Through a contact with real estate agent 
Marshall Larson, later to become employed by Fairbourn, Fairbourn 
learned of a potential buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. Rochelle was 
an affiliate of Liberty Homes, a major residential home builder in the 
Salt Lake City area. 
In early August 1999, Rochelle made a preliminary proposal to 
buy the property. Rochelle's proposal, presented in the form of "an 
official notice of intent" letter, led to a meeting among representatives 
E \Laune\Amerhous\FairAppeal\AppellateBnef v2 wpd Page 41 
of American, Rochelle, and Fairbourn. Numerous elements of 
possible transactions were discussed at the meeting, including a 
remark by Mr. Alvarez that any deal must include a provision 
concerning the buyer's ability to perform. Mr. Fairbourn, who attended 
the meeting, was aware of the exigent circumstances in which 
American found itself and recognized that American had a legitimate 
interest in securing a buyer who could be counted on to perform. 
R. 231-33; Addendum "A" attached hereto at pages 1-3.) 
The trial court then compared the language requiring Rochelle to provide 
evidence of financial capability to close with the language contained in paragraph 
'.2 of the purchase agreement regarding a financing contingency which is form 
anguage in the standard Utah real estate purchase contract. (R. 234) Section 7.2 
/as inapplicable regarding the Purchase Agreement between American and 
tochelle because Rochelle's purchase was not contingent upon Rochelle obtaining 
nancing. (T. 406.) However, the standard language of 7.2 states that even if a 
uyer is unable to obtain financing, the buyer may nevertheless insist that the seller 
erform by "providing the seller with absolute assurance that the proceeds required 
) close the sale are available." (R. 234; T. 406; R. 410 at Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" 
ttached hereto.) In addition, the Purchase Agreement has a total purchase price 
F
 $2,277,000, closing was to occur within fourteen days after American received 
at plan approval from the city of West Jordan, and the purchase price was due in 
ish at closing. (R. 410 at Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) 
The trial court disregarded the testimony of Mr. Alvarez regarding what 
Dchelle was to provide under Paragraph 3. It therefore construed Paragraph 3 
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and the Purchase Agreement in accordance with the arguments of Fairbourn. (R. 
236; Addendum "A" attached hereto at page 6.) 
The trial court's construction is clearly erroneous in that it determined that the 
language regarding Rochelle's production of evidence of financial capability to close 
was somehow inferior to the "absolute assurance" language found in paragraph 7.2 
of the Purchase Agreement. Such language, along with the purchase price and 
closing requirements contained in the Purchase Agreement, demonstrate that 
Rochelle was to provide evidence of its closing ability within two weeks of the 
execution of the Purchase Agreement. Despite uncontroverted testimony from the 
negotiators of the Purchase Agreement that American needed to close quickly and 
with a financially strong buyer, and uncontroverted testimony that Rochelle's 
purchase of the Property was not contingent on financing, the court erred in holding 
that the intent of the parties was to not require Rochelle to provide absolute 
assurance to American that it had that ability to close. 
The language and context in which the Purchase Contract was negotiated 
are much more credible evidence than the evidence of witnesses who have a 
financial stake in the outcome of this matter (Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson) or 
witnesses that lost out on a potentially profitable transaction (Mr. Clark and Mr. 
Gardner). The construction of the Purchase Agreement by the trial court is 
therefore clearly erroneous regarding Rochelle's duty to provide evidence of 
financial capability to close and should therefore be overturned. 
E \Laune\Amertious\FairAppeal\AppellateBnef v2 wpd Page 43 
a. The Trial Court Erred in Holding That American Failed to 
Communicate, or Subsequently Clarify. What it Would 
Consider Proof of Rochelle's Financial Ability to Close. 
The trial court erred in determining that American failed to communicate to 
Rochelle its expectations of the evidence of Rochelle's financial capability that it 
/vould find satisfactory. (R. 237.) The trial court further erred in determining that 
\merican failed to provide Rochelle any meaningful clarification of its interpretation 
)f what would be sufficient evidence for the benefit of Rochelle. (R. 237.) 
If the terms of the purchase agreement are ambiguous regarding the 
evidence of financial capability to close" the trial court erred in construing the parol 
jvidence regarding the intent of American and Rochelle when entering into the 
3urchase Agreement. The trial court's construction of an ambiguous contract is a 
luestion of fact that is reviewed under clearly erroneous standard. Craig Food 
idustries. Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P. 2d 279,283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In overturning 
uch a ruling by a trial court this Court must find that the evidence is insufficient 
dewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's construction." 
\lest Valley City at 1313. As noted in Section I. B. c above, the challenging party 
nust marshal all the evidence in support of the findings." Robb v. Anderton. 863 
.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993). 
Though Mr. Simon produced the two letters from First Security which were 
> be the evidence of Rochelle's financial ability to close, both Mr. Alvarez and Mr. 
imon testified that they did not communicate directly with each other regarding the 
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evidence of financial ability that American would find sufficient. (T. 145-46; T. 168-
69; T. 200; T. 237-38) Therefore, any communications from American to First 
Security regarding what American would find as sufficient evidence of financial 
capability to close would have been communicated from American through either/or 
Fairbourn and Rochelle to Mr. Simon at First Security. 
Consistent with the trial court's ruling, Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark 
and Mr. Gardner all testified that though Armando requested proof of Rochelle's 
financial ability to perform, he did not mention cash, a binding loan commitment, or 
a letter of credit before the initial letter. (T. 318-19; T. 404; T. 263; T. 289-90.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner all 
consistently testified that even after American had rejected the initial letter from First 
Security that American never clarified that it sought evidence of cash, a letter of 
credit or a firm loan commitment from First Security would be sufficient. (T. 274; T. 
282-83; T. 321; T. 356; T. 386-87; T. 420-24; T. 439; T. 447; T. 451-52; T. 459-64.) 
Furthermore, all four initially thought that both letters from First Security were more 
than sufficient to meet the purchase agreement's requirement that Rochelle provide 
American evidence of its financial ability to close. (T. 53-75; T. 306-10; T. 400-01; 
T. 261-63; T. 289.) 
Mr. Alvarez's testimony completely contradicted the testimony of Mr. 
Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Gardner. Mr. Alvarez testified that he 
specifically requested that Rochelle provide cash, a line of credit, a letter of credit. 
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(T. 59-60; T. 503-06; T. 529-30.) Mr. Alvarez testified that after the initial letter from 
Rrst Security Bank, he clarified to Mr. Fairbourn that he required evidence in the 
orm of cash, or an existing line of credit. (T. 174; T. 224-25; T. 503-06.) The trial 
x>urt disregarded this testimony, holding that American "declined to provide any 
neaningful clarification of [its] interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle." (R. 237; 
\ddendum "A" attached hereto at page 7.) 
The fatal flaw in the court's reasoning is that it did not acknowledge Mr. 
Simon's testimony. Mr. Simon at First Security was the only truly "independent" 
witness in this matter regarding what was communicated to him regarding 
American's requirements for evidence of Rochelle's financial ability. Mr. Simon 
9stified with respect to the first letter requested from First Security Bank, that he 
ould not provide Rochelle with an unconditional commitment letter and is unsure 
whether one was requested or not. (T. 246-47.) When the initial letter was rejected 
y American, Mr. Simon testified that someone acting on Rochelle's behalf 
jquested an absolute loan commitment which he was not able to provide. (T. 248, 
52.) Furthermore, Mr. Simon's consistent pretrial deposition testimony was read 
ito the record where he stated that his understanding was that American was 
anting an absolute commitment from First Security "again" after rejecting the first 
tter. (T. 253-54.) 
In summary, Mr. Alvarez requested that Rochelle provide evidence of cash, 
line of credit, or a loan commitment. (T. 274; T. 282-83; T. 321; T. 356; T. 386-
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87; T. 420-24; T. 439; T. 447; T. 451-52; T. 459-64.) Though the testimonies of Mr. 
Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner were that Mr. Alvarez had 
requested no such evidence, Mr. Simon at First Security had the same 
understanding as Mr. Alvarez: that American required an absolute commitment 
regarding Rochelle's financial ability to close the purchase. (T 246-48, 252.) 
Though Mr. Alvarez only spoke with Mr. Fairbourn regarding clarification of 
Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement after the first letter from First Security, that 
same request reached the ears of Mr. Simon at First Security who was to provide 
such evidence. The trial court's conclusion that American had failed to 
communicate what it required from Rochelle is clearly erroneous in light of the 
independent testimony of Mr. Simon, that he had a clear understanding of what 
American was requesting, he was just unable to provide it. 
b. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Impute Rochelle's 
Agent's Understanding of the Financial Capability Clause 
to Rochelle. 
The trial court erred in failing to impute the knowledge of Rochelle's agent, 
Mr. Larson, to Rochelle regarding what evidence of Rochelle's financial ability to 
close Rochelle needed to provide American to satisfy Paragraph 3. Imputation of 
an agent's knowledge to a principal is a conclusion of law by the trial court that is 
reviewed for correctness. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 
1311,1313 (Utah 1991); Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P. 2d 1234,1251 (Utah 1998). 
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Under Utah law, personal knowledge of an agent is imputed to the principal 
"concerning a matter as to which . . . it is his duty to give the principal information." 
Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 157 (Utah 1991). "An agent's 
knowledge of matters within the scope of his or her authority is imputed to his or her 
principal, for it is presumed that such knowledge will be disclosed to the principal." 
Maoris v. Sculptured Software. Inc.. 2001 UT 43, U 21,24 P.3d 984 (citing FAM Fin. 
3orp. v. Hansen Dairy. Inc.. 617 P.2d 327, 329-30 (Utah 1980). 
In the matter at hand, Marshall Larson acted as Rochelle's real estate agent 
egarding the purchase of the Property and was associated with Fairbourn during 
he events relevant hereto. (T. 390-92.) At trial, Mr. Larson testified that after 
\merican rejected the initial First Security letter, his understanding was that Mr. 
\lvarez of American was "saying that he needs some kind of credit lines or 
something stronger: and that American requested evidence that's "got to have 
;omething about lines of credit." (T. 420-21.) When Mr. Larson met with Mr. Simon 
>f First Security to obtain stronger evidence, he testified that he had indicated that 
.uch evidence "has got to have something credit or something mores substantial" 
md that Mr. Simon indicated he couldn't "make any guarantees." (T. 423-24.) Mr. 
.arson further testified that he jokingly requested Mr. Simon "to give me a 
uarantee and have it notarized that you will give me the money." (T. 450.) 
As Rochelle's agent, such knowledge and understanding is imputed to 
tochelle. The trial court's conclusion that American "declined to provide any 
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meaningful clarification of his interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle" is not 
consistent with the testimony of Rochelle's agent regarding the same. (R. 237; 
Addendum "A" attached hereto at page 7.) Imputation of such knowledge to 
Rochelle mandates reversal of the trial court's ruling in favor of Fairbourn. 
II. THE CONDITIONS OF THE LISTING AGREEMENT WERE NOT 
FULFILLED THEREBY DEFEATING FAIRBOURN'S CLAIM FOR 
COMMISSION. 
Even if the trial court is correct regarding the ambiguity of the Purchase 
Agreement and its interpretation, independent arguments mandating judgment in 
American's favor include conditions of the Listing Agreement that were not fulfilled 
thereby defeating Fairbourn's claim for commission under the Listing Agreement. 
A. The Trial Court Erred In Holding That Fairbourn had 
Produced a Ready, Willing and Able Buyer. 
The trial court erred in failing to find that Fairbourn had met its contractual 
duties under the Listing Agreement to provide American a ready, willing and able 
buyer pursuant to Utah law as set forth in Sproul v. Parks. 116 Utah 368,210 P. 2d 
436 Utah (1949). (See Larson testimony at page 445-46 where he agrees that he 
must provide a willing and able buyer.) Even if the trial court was correct regarding 
the ambiguity of the Purchase Agreement and its interpretation, an independent 
argument mandating judgment in American's favor is that Fairbourn failed to 
provide a "ready, willing and able buyer" entitling Fairbourn to commission under 
the Listing Agreement. Though this issue was raised and briefed before the trial 
court, the trial court did not mention it its Memorandum Decision. (R. 219-21; R. 
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231-40.) A question of "contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic 
svidence [is a] matter of law" and the appellate court accords "the trial court's 
nterpretation no presumption of correctness." Lee v. Barnes. 1999 UT Ct. App. 
126, U 7, 977 P.2d 550 (citations omitted). 
The Listing Agreement between Fairboum and American states that 
rairbourn is to procure an offer from Rochelle "at the price and upon the terms set 
orth herein" and "upon any other terms or conditions acceptable to" American. (R. 
HO; R. 410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) Such terms include the 
inancial capability of Rochelle as contained in Paragraph 3 which has been defined 
i case law in this jurisdiction as well as others as argued above in Section I. A. iii. 
>vs the Utah Supreme Court state in Sproul. an able buyer "does not mean a 
purchaser who will not be ready for some time." Sproul. at 438. 
In the case at hand, the evidence is undisputed that Rochelle intended to 
'btain a loan from which it would satisfy the balance of the purchase price at the 
losing of the purchase. (R. 234; Addendum "A" attached hereto at page 4.) As 
videnced by the two letters prepared by First Security, Rochelle could not 
emonstrate within the 14 day period a current ability to close the purchase but was 
ependent upon a non-binding expression of willingness from First Security that 
ometime in the future it might make a loan to Rochelle to purchase the Property, 
ependent upon numerous factors. (R. 410, Ex. Nos. 7 and 11; Addenda "D" and 
E" attached hereto.) Rochelle did not demonstrate within 14 days that it had a 
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current ability to purchase; at best Rochelle demonstrated a future contingent ability 
to purchase the Property. Because Rochelle was not able to satisfy a contract 
contingency, American was entitled to terminate the Purchase Agreement. 
Because Rochelle was not able to purchase under terms acceptable to American, 
Fairboum failed to procure an "able" buyer and is therefor not entitled to 
commission. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Hold That 
Fairbourn's Commission was due upon the Closing 
of the Rochelle Sale. 
The trial court also erred in failing to hold that the plain language of the 
Listing Agreement requires that Fairbourn's commission was due upon the closing 
of the Rochelle sale. The trial court's interpretation of a contract not requiring resort 
to extrinsic evidence is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. Lee v. 
Barnes. 977 P. 2d 550, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Under Utah law, the general rule is that a "broker is not an insurer of the 
subsequent performance of the contract and is not deprived of his right to a 
commission by the failure" of the completion of the purchase. Robert Langston. Ltd. 
v. McQuarrie. 741 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). There 
is an exception to this general rule that if the broker listing agreement contains a 
"contractual provision which conditions the right to a commission on the 
performance" of the buyer. Jd, (citations omitted). Furthermore, "if the broker's 
agreement provides that his commission is to be paid from purchase money 
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installments, the receipt of the installments is a condition precedent to recovery." 
Bushnell Real Estate Inc. v. Nielsen. 672 P. 2d 746, 750 (Utah 1983) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Ferrarav. Firschina. 91 Nev. 254,533 P.2d 1351,1352-53 (1975). 
In the case at hand, Fairbourn's Listing Agreement with American provides 
that American's payment of commission to Fairbourn is due "as soon as sale or 
3xchange of said property is consummated" and " shall be due and payable at 
closing." (R. 410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) Because the Listing 
Agreement specifically provides that Fairbourn's commission is to be paid at the 
ime of closing, the closing of the Rochelle purchase is a condition precedent to 
rairbourn's recovery of commissions. Because there was no closing, Rochelle is 
herefore not entitled to recovery of commission in this matter. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT 
FAIRBOURN HAD BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO 
AMERICAN THEREBY PRECLUDING FAIRBOURN'S RECOVERY 
OF COMMISSION. 
Another independent argument mandating judgment in American's favor is 
hat Fairbourn breached its fiduciary duties to American as its real estate broker 
hereby precluding its recovery of commission from American. Though this issue 
/as raised before the trial court during closing argument4, the trial court did not 
lention it its Memorandum Decision. (R. 231-40.) The trial court's determination 
lat Fairbourn breached no fiduciary duty is a mixed question of facts and law that 
4The record of this oral argument was inadvertently not recorded. 
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is reviewed de novo with a grant of discretion to the trial court. C & Y Corp. v. 
General Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In C & YCorp.. the Utah Court of Appeals was reviewing corporate directors' 
breach of fiduciary duty to their corporation regarding the sale of a corporate 
division to the directors personally. I d at 54-55. The Court of Appeals determined 
that the facts to which the legal rule in question applied are so complex and varying 
that no rule can adequately be spelled out and that the trial court's observance of 
witness appearance and demeanor could not be adequately reflected in the record 
so the trial court should therefor be given broad discretion in applying a legal 
principle to facts. JdL at 53 (citations omitted). In contrast, the case at hand deals 
with the fiduciary duties of a real estate broker to its principal which are clearly 
spelled out in Utah law as set forth below. The facts demonstrating Fairboum's 
breach of fiduciary duties is largely undisputed and therefore well reflected in the 
record. This Court should therefore apply a narrower standard of review, closer to 
a de novo review, to the trial court's application of legal principle of Fairboum's 
breach of its fiduciary duties to American denying its recovery of commission. IgL 
(citations omitted). 
Under Utah law it is a well-established principle that a real estate broker owes 
a fiduciary duty to its principal in a real estate transaction. Reese v. Harper. 8 Utah 
2d 119, 329 P.2d 410, 412 (1958) (citations omitted). "It is incumbent upon him to 
apply his abilities and knowledge to the advantage of the man he serves; and to 
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make full disclosure of all facts which his principal should know in transacting the 
business." Id, (citations omitted). If a broker fails "to discharge such duty with 
reasonable diligence and care [it] precludes his recovery for the service he purports 
o be rendering." i d Breaches of fiduciary duty required by brokers precluding 
ecovery of commissions, or in the alternative recovery of damages, include: (1) 
ailure to disclose conditions of buyer's down payment (ig\ citing Reich v. 
:hristopulos. 123 Utah 137, 256 P.2d 238); (2) failure to explain the terms of the 
eal estate purchase contract and the variance from the terms of the listing 
igreement (id at 412-13 citing Duncan v. Barbour. 188 Va. 53,49 S.E.2d 260); (3) 
ailure to disclose the material facts of the real estate purchase contract (ioL at 413); 
nd (4) failure to disclose facts within broker's knowledge which would have 
svealed the highly unreliable nature of the check received as earnest money 
Hopkins v. Wardley Corporation. 611 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Utah 1980)). 
In the case at hand, Fairbourn breached its fiduciary duty to American 
irough its agent Mr. Fairbourn in three ways. First, while Mr. Fairbourn acted as 
i agent for American, he knew that Rochelle would have to apply for a loan in 
•der to be able to purchase the Property but did not inform Mr. Alvarez or 
merican of the same. (T. 345-47.) This fact was especially material given that 
merican was attempting to firm up the sale of the Property due to the difficult 
nation American found itself regarding the extension of the Coons Contract, the 
ming of the Property, and the need to be certain that Rochelle had the financial 
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capability to close the sale. (R. 232; T. 38-87; Addendum "A" attached hereto.) Mr. 
Fairbourn also conceded that a reader of the Purchase Agreement would not note 
that Rochelle expected to obtain financing for the purchase. (T. 349.) American 
was so concerned about Rochelle's abilities that it placed Paragraph 3 in the 
Purchase Agreement requiring evidence of Rochelle's financial ability to close and 
first learned that Rochelle was contemplating a future loan when notified by First 
Security Bank. (R. 233; T. 59-60, 102.) Second, Fairbourn put American in 
jeopardy of losing the Coons Contract due to Rochelle's purchase not being 
contingent upon financing but not requiring "absolute" evidence of Rochelle's 
financial ability to close. Third, Fairbourn placed American in risk of being liable for 
commissions to Fairbourn without actually closing the Property to Rochelle, the 
heart of the controversy before this court. 
Fairbourn therefore breached its fiduciary duty to American by failing to 
disclose a material fact regarding Rochelle's offer to purchase the Property, placing 
American in danger of losing the Coons Contract, and causing American to be 
liable for commission though no sale of the Property took place. Such breaches 
deny Fairbourn recovery of commission in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this court 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court for 
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calculation and award of Appellant's attorneys' fees and costs in successfully 
defending against Appellee's cause of action, both at trial and on appeal. 
DATED this 13 day of August, 2002. 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
JOHN L. ADAMS 
POOLE & ADAMS, L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC., a Utah 
corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN HOUSING PARTNERS INC., 
a Delaware corporation, and ARMANDO J. 
ALVAREZ, an individual 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 000902534 
JUDGE RONALD E. NEHRING 
On August 6th, 7th, and 29th' 20011 presided over a bench trial in this matter. Following the 
inclusion of the trial, I took the case under advisement. Now, having fully considered the 
guments of counsel, submissions of the parties and the applicable legal authority I render the 
[lowing Memorandum Decision which incorporates my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
In early 1999, defendant Armando Alvarez approached James Fairbourn of plaintiff 
irbourn Commercial Inc., a real estate brokerage, for assistance in selling a parcel of real property 
;ated in West Jordan, Utah. Mr. Alvarez was acting on behalf of defendant American Housing 
rtners, Inc. He was also a licensed real estate broker. 
American was wholly owned by Armando Alvarez's brother, Sergio. American had entered 
:> an agreement to buy the West Jordan property from its owners, the Coon's. At the time that 
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Alvarez began his conversations with Mr. Fairbourn, American had encountered considerable 
obstacles in gaining the approvals from the city of West Jordan necessary to develop the property. 
These problems placed American's purchase agreement with the Coons in peril. 
During the first seven months of 1999, American pressed ahead on three fronts: the effort to 
gain municipal approval of its development plan; the effort to preserve the purchase agreement with 
the Coons; and the effort to find a buyer for the property who would pay the Coon's selling price, 
put some money in American's pocket, and free American from its entanglements with West Jordan 
officials. Mr. Fairbourn and his company were enlisted to aid American in the third undertaking. 
He proposed that American seek a buyer for the property marketed as "paper lots" - lots which had 
received plat approval but which had not been improved. 
The pressure on American to act mounted in late July 1999 when the Coons notified 
American that it was "ending and terminating any and all agreements" relating to the property 
because American had failed to close. In late August 1999, the Coons agreed to reinstate its contract 
of sale with American through December 1,1999. As American worked to salvage the deal with the 
Coons it scored a success with West Jordan when it persuaded the city to approve the necessary 
zoning for the property if American would acquire an adjacent parcel of property owned by an 
opponent of American's proposed development. 
In this uncertain setting, Fairbourn moved ahead with the performance of its task. Through 
a contact with real estate agent Marshall Larson, later to become employed by Fairbourn, Fairbourn 
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learned of a potential buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. Rochelle was an affiliate of Liberty Homes, 
a major residential home builder in the Salt Lake City area. 
In early August 1999, Rochelle made a preliminary proposal to buy the property. Rochelle's 
proposal, presented in the form of "an official notice of intent" letter, led to a meeting among 
epresentatives of American, Rochelle, and Fairbourn. Numerous elements of possible transactions 
vere discussed at the meeting, including a remark by Mr. Alavarez that any deal must include a 
>ro vision concerning the buyer's ability to perform. Mr. Fairbourn, who attended the meeting, was 
ware of the exigent circumstances in which American found itself and recognized that American 
Lad a legitimate interest in securing a buyer who could be counted on to perform. 
On August 13,1999, Rochelle made an offer to buy the property. The offer was presented 
irough a pre-printed Real Estate Purchase Contract and handwritten addendum. It was 
ccompanied by a Single Party Listing and Sale Agreement which obligated American to pay 
airbourn a $1,500.00 per lot commission if Rochelle bought the property for $2,277,000.00 cash. 
he Listing Agreement indicated that the property contained "approx (sic) 99 undeveloped lots." 
American rejected Rochelle's offer. Rochelle presented a second offer several days later 
hich was met with a counter offer. American's counter offer was presented in typewritten form 
id incorporated the terms of Rochelle's second offer while adding several new provisions. Among 
e new provisions was term titled "Financial Capability." This term stated: 
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Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both 
parties, buyer shall supply to seller with evidence of financial 
capability to close on the Property within the time frame reference 
above. In the event Buyer is unable to provide said evidence, Seller 
shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and neither party shall 
have any further obligation to the other. 
Mr. Alvarez inserted the Financial Capability term into the counter offer because under the 
terms of the proposed sale Rochelle's duty to perform was not contingent on its acquisition of 
financing pursuant to paragraph two of the Purchase Contract. While this contract provision, when 
elected, excuses the buyer's duty to perform if he is unable to obtain financing under the specified 
terms, the buyer is required pursuant to paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract to make timely 
application for financing. If financing is unavailable on the terms agreed to in the Purchase Contract, 
a buyer may nevertheless insist that the seller perform by "providing Seller with absolute assurance" 
that the proceeds required to close the sale are available. Mr. Alvarez believed that the Financial 
Capability term would serve as a substitute for these "buyer's undertakings" which did not apply to 
Rochelle because it did not elect to make its purchase contingent on financing. 
The parties met on the day the counter offer was accepted. At the meeting they reviewed the 
terms of the sale and made several changes to the counter offer by interlineation. The Financial 
Capability clause was discussed at the meeting. Marshall Larson, a real estate agent employed by 
Fairbourn but who represented Rochelle under the terms of a dual agency agreement, believed that 
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Vlr. Alvarez intended to require a letter from Rochelle's bank in the form of an unofficial loan 
commitment. 
Acting on this interpretation, Mr. Larson contacted Cy Simon, a construction loan officer at 
?irst Secuiity Bank and sought a letter to provide evidence of financial capability. Mr. Simon and 
rirst Security had a banking relationship with Liberty and Rochelle. Although Mr. Larson asked Mr. 
limon to provide a loan commitment, I do not find that Mr. Alvarez expressed to anyone at anytime 
is intention that only a binding loan commitment or letter of credit would satisfy his definition of 
dequate financial capability. The participants in this transaction shared considerable experience and 
sphistication in real estate development and financing. I credit the observation made by David 
lark, the owner of Liberty Homes who negotiated on behalf of Rochelle, that he would have taken 
ote of a demand that the evidence be in the form of proof of available cash, a loan commitment, or 
Iter or credit because none of this evidence could have been obtained from a bank within the 14 
ays allotted for its production. The letter, which Mr. Simon prepared for American on behalf of 
ochelle, stated, "I would not expect having difficulty making acquisition and development loans 
o Rochelle] in the future, barring something unforeseen in the economy." 
Mr. Alvarez rejected Mr. Simon's letter. Mr. Alvarez told Mr. Fairbourn, who was acting 
American's agent under the dual agency agreement, that the evidence from First Security must 
ference a line of credit and that the contents of Mr. Simon's letter was "not what we had 
scussed." Mr. Fairbourn met with Mr. Larson and Mr. Simon for the purpose of discussing the 
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contents of a second "evidence" letter. Mr. Simon prepared a letter dated September 17,1999 which 
referenced credit lines held by Liberty and Rochelle and, while making allowance for predictable 
guarded banker rhetoric, painted a positive picture of Rochelle's financial strength. 
On September 21,1999, Mr. Alvarez told Mr. Fairbourn that he had rejected the second letter 
and that American was terminating the purchase contract because Rochelle had failed to provide the 
necessary evidence of financial capability. 
The merits of Fairbourn's claim that American's termination of the purchase contract was 
wrongful turns on the outcome of an analysis of the Financial Capability clause. I find that the 
provision is ambiguous. The language of the clause gives no guidance to either the quantity or 
quality of evidence which Rochelle must produce to demonstrate financial capability. Despite Mr. 
Alvarez's contention that the provision was drafted as a substitute for paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase 
Contract, it has none of the precision of, for example, the "absolute assurance" language found in 
that paragraph. 
The extrinsic evidence relating to the Financial Capability clause yields the conclusion that 
Rochelle reasonably interpreted the clause in a manner consistent with paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase 
Contract to the extent that it required evidence that First Security Bank make a commitment to loan 
Rochelle money "subject only to changes of conditions in the Buyer's credit worthiness and to 
normal loan closing procedures." 
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Although Mr. Fairbourn, who represented American throughout the aborted transaction, was 
tware of the circumstances which made a strong buyer important to American, he could not have 
>een expected to draw from this knowledge the details of the financial capability evidence that Mr. 
Uvarez presumably knew but did not communicate either to Mr. Fairbourn or Rochelle. By 
ontrast, Mr. Alvarez had ample reason to know what Rochelle's interpretation of the Financial 
"apability clause was. The pre-printed Purchase Contract gives legal expression to the respective 
iterests of buyers and sellers in the face of the practical business reality that most real estate 
ansactions involve financing, provided either by the seller or by a third party. In this transaction 
etween experienced developers, it could not have come as a surprise to Mr. Alvarez to receive the 
rst letter from Mr. Simon. Even if Mr. Alvarez had been surprised by the contents of the letter, he 
ras in an advantaged position to remedy what he then knew to be Rochelle's misapprehension of 
LS expectations for evidence of financial capability. He nevertheless declined to provide any 
leaningful clarification of his interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle. 
Mr. Alvarez drafted the Financial Capability clause on behalf of American. American was, 
erefore, wholly responsible for its ambiguity. The existence of the ambiguity should have become 
)parent to Mr. Alvarez upon receiving Mr. Simon's letter, and his knowledge of the ambiguity 
oipled with his responsibility for it created an obligation for Mr. Alvarez to clarify the ambiguity. 
s failed, however, to do this and it is therefore appropriate in this setting to invoke the principle 
at words used in an agreement are construed against the drafter. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
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McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996). The propriety of turning to this rule 
of contract interpretation is buttressed in this case by equitable considerations. In Simonson v. 
Travis, 728 P.2d 999 (Utah, 1986), our Supreme Court construed the language of a release against 
the defendant's insurer after the plaintiff sought clarification of an ambiguity in the release and the 
adjuster's explanation was inadequate. The Court found that it would be inequitable to enforce the 
release against the plaintiff when the "defendant was wholly responsible for the ambiguity and the 
subsequent ambiguous explanation." Id, at 1002. 
Accordingly, I find that American breached the terms of its listing agreement with Fairbourn. 
Fairbourn is entitled to the benefit of its bargain, or $1,500.00 for 99 lots resulting in a total damage 
award against American of $148,500.00 together with an award of reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs.. 
I reject Fairbourn's claim for relief against Mr. Alvarez based on alleged violations of Utah 
law governing the regulation of those engaged in the real estate business, Utah Code Ann. §§61-2-1-
24 (2000). Fairbourn insists that it has a private right of action against Mr, Alvarez pursuant to Utah 
Code Ami. §61-2-17 (4) which states, 
If any person receives any money or its equivalent, as commission, 
compensation, or profit by or in consequence of a violation of this 
chapter, that person is liable for an additional penalty of not less than 
the amount of the money received and not more than three times 
the amount of money received, as may be determined by the court. 
This penalty may be sued for in any court of competent jurisdiction, 
and recovered by any person aggrieved for his own use and benefit. 
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The misconduct which gives rise to a cause of action under this section is limited to acts 
)erformed by persons regulated under Chapter 2 of Title 61 in the course of their business as a real 
estate agent or broker. I decline Fairbourn's invitation to broadly interpret this provision to reach 
ill business activities of a licensed agent or broker. Such a reading of §61-2-17 would lead to the 
learly irrational result of exposing everyone holding a real estate license for treble damages for 
heir acts of dishonestly, or lapses in integrity irrespective of whether the conduct occurred in 
onnection with their activities as an agent or broker. 
Mr. Alvarez was not acting as a real estate agent in this transaction and his conduct is not 
ubject to the imposition of the penalty provision of §61-2-17. 
Finally, Fairbourn argues that Alvarez improperly interfered with its economic relations by 
reaching the Purchase Contract with Rochelle in order to enter into a more lucrative contract with 
tiother party. In order to recover damages under the tort of interference with prospective economic 
Nations a plaintiff must prove "(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs 
dsting or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) 
msing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh Furniture v T. Richard Isom 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiff fails to prove that Alvarez intentionally interfered with Fairbourn's economic 
lations with American for an improper purpose or by improper means. While I have concluded 
at the terms of the Purchase Agreement should be construed against defendant, I am unwilling to 
cribe an outright "intentional" or "improper" label to Alvarez's conduct. A deliberate breach of 
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contract in and ofitselfdoes not constitute an improper means. Id. at 309. A tort action only exists 
if the interference with business relations is not an incidental consequence of the breach— but an 
actual motive therefor. Id. at 310. In this case I am unable to make that conclusion and 
consequently plaintiffs cause of action against Alvarez for tortious interference with economic 
relations is denied. 
Dated this ^ day of October, 2001. 
RONALD E. NEHRING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL 
V. AMERICAN HOUSING 
teil R. Sabin 
attorney for Plaintiff 
0 E. South Temple, Suite 1100 
alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
)ennis K. Poole 
ohn L. Adams 
Lttorneys for Defendants 
543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
alt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, 
o the following, thiss^Qday of October, 2001: 
TabB 
INVESTMENT-INDUSTRIAL-COMMERCIAL 
This is a legally binding Contract The Buyer and Seller may legally agree in writing to alter 
or delete provisions of this form If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax lawyer 
— — — — EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
yer KCs&rtS^f'^i T ^ f l / f e ^ T t S _T . L*f offers to purchase the Property described below and deliver as Earnest 
Deposits SfidQ*& in theform of £jtf£Cd/ to 
brokerage, to be deposited within three business days after Acceptance by all parties of this Offer to Purchase 
rule/Escrow Company identified below 
ge or Title/Escrow Company / ? g ^ ^ / l ~ L T?ft/^ Address tAVLtM MfoP V CjgAf-r&r? 
d by on this date Phone Number 
Escrow Company, for deposit no later than (date) 
r 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
PERTY: 
ro So then CJ&ZT CJ AJ^^M^C^VSTLZA. y&ttO o'" fipjcft W&S7- \i< AJt?<~^/tf)Vbl£owtvS'/L.dti. State / Q ? j - y 
description of Property see Q attached Addendum # ^preliminary title report when available as provided below 
INCLUDED ITEMS Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures presently attached to Property The following personal property 
i be included in this sale and conveyed under a separate Bill of Sale with Warranties as to title /ty / \ 
EXCLUDED ITEMS- These items are excluded from this sale jj A-
:HAS^PRICE AND FINANCING Buyer agrees to pay for Property as follows 
vO K Earnest Money Deposit 
Loan Proceeds: 
• Representing the liability to be assumed by Buyer under an existing assumable loan, • with Q without Seller being released of 
liability, in this approximate amount with • Buyer • Seller agreeing to pay any loan transfer and assumption fees Any net differences 
between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual balance at Closing shall be then adjusted in Q cash Q other 
• From new institutional financing on terms no less favorable to Buyer than the following Interest rate for first period prior to 
adjustment, if any %, Amortization period , Term Other than these, the loan terms shall be the best 
obtainable under the loan for which Bu>er applies below 
Seller Financing: (see attached Seller Financing Addendum) 
Other 
' ^ , ^ B a l a n c e of Purchase Price in Cash at Closing 
nJV0Xot*\ Purchase Price — S££ ^ A A ^ ^ £ ^ 
INC. This transaction shall be closed on or beforeJfeel ^ P ^ T l o s m g s h a l l occur when (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each 
> the Title/Escrow Company), all documents required by this Contract, byjLender, by written escrow instructions signed by Buyer and Seller, and by 
law, (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the Escrow/Title Company in the form of collected or cleared 
(c) the deed which Seller has agreed to deliver under Section 6 has been recorded Buyer and Seller shall each pay one-half of the escrow Closing 
otherwise agreed in writing by the parties Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as 
this Section AH deposits on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of J _ ( date of 
date of possession, other 
SSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within TIA^\) hours after Closing 
RMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE At the signing of this Contract the Listing Agent Cfo /^ &pRf<&li£AJ represents J ^ Seller 
md the Selling Agent /HA^Si^ffL t^&JFK/ represents • Seller JS^ Buyer Buyer and Seller confirm that pnor to signing this Contract 
iosure of agency relationship was provided to her/him ^ f j / ^> Buyer's initials ( ) Seller's initials 
TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE, (a) Selferhas, or shall have at Closing, free title to Property and agrees to convey such title to 
V general Q special warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as warranted under Section 10 6 (b) Seller agrees to pay for, and fiirnish Buyer 
tfith a current standard from Owner's policy of title insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price, (c) the title policy shall conform with 
gations under subsections (a) and (b) above Unless otherwise agreed under Section 8 4, the commitment shall conform with the title insurance 
t provided under Section 7 1 
per elects to obtain a full-coverage extended ALTA policy of title insurance under section 6(b) The cost of this coverage, above that of a standard 
icy shall be paid for by }2L Buyer • Seller Also, the cost of a full-coverage ALTA survey shall be paid for by K Buyer Q Seller 
IC UNDERTAKINGS OF SELLER AND BUYER 
,LLER DISCLOSURES. Seller will deliver to Buyer the following Seller Disclosures no later than the number of calendar days indicated below 
be after Acceptance 
a Seller Property Disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller • 
a commitment for the policy of title insurance required under Section 6, to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller 
»g copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment / Q 
a copy of all loan documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber Property after Closing f r> 
a copy of all leases and rental agreements now in effect with regard to Property together with a current rent roll .-- •-
operating statements of Property for its last full fiscal years of operation plus the current fiscal year through 
, certified by Seller or by an independent auditor *—• 
enant Estoppel agreements *—* ~ 
to pay any charge for cancellation to the title commitment provided under subsection (b) 
does not provide any of the Seller Disclosures within the time periods agreed above, Buyer may either waive the particular Seller Disclosure 
»y taking no timely action or Buyer may notify Seller in writing within
 VS calendar days after the expiration of the particular disclosure time 
tier is in Default under this Contract and that the remedies under Section 16 are at Buyer's disposal The holder of the Earnest Money Deposit 
ceipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of further written authorization 
MR UNDERTAKINGS. Buyer agrees to 
pply for approval of the assumption or funding of the loan proceeds described in Section 2 by completing, signing, and 
g to the Lender the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender and by paying all fees as required by the 
ppraisal fee included, no later than calendar days after Acceptance, and 
o later than calendar days after Acceptance, obtain from the Lender to whom application is made under subsection 
ten commitment to approve the assumption of the existing loan or to fund the new loan subject only to changes of conditions in 
redit worthiness and to normal loan closing procedures, or, if Buyer elects, providing Seller with absolute assurance, within 
time frame, that the proceeds required for funding the Total Purchase Price are available 
Indertakings are at the sole expense of Buyer and are material elements of this Contract for the benefit of both Buyer and Seller 
ioes not initiate any Buyer Undertakings and provide Seller with written confirmation in the time agreed above, Seller may either waive the 
tr Undertaking requirement by taking no timely action or Seller may notify Buyer in writing within calendar days of the expiration of 
ndertaking time period that Buyer is in Default under this Contract and that the remedies under Section 16 are at Seller's disposal The holder of 
oney Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Sellers written notice, deliver to Seller the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of 
authorization from Buyer 
ITIONAL DUE DILIGENCE Buyer shall undertake the following Addition Due Diligence elements at its own expense and for its own 
turpose of complying with the Contingencies under Section 8 
denng and obtaining an appraisal of the Property if one is not otherwise required under Section 7 2, 
denng and obtaining a survey of the Property if one is not otherwise required under Section 6, 
ienng and obtaining a physical inspection report regarding, and completing a personal inspection of the Property, 
ienng and obtaining any environmentally related study of the Property, 
guesting and obtaining verification that the Property complies with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, ordinances, and requlations with 
and permissible use of the Property 
jooperate fully with Buyer's completing these Due Dilipen^ matiMx **A * 1 - ••.-» 
Dihgtnce matters in Section 7 Buyers discretion however for approving the terms of the loan under subsection 7 2 (b) is subiect Buyers covenant with 
regard to minimally acceptable financing terms under Section 2 
8 I Buyer shall have calendar days after the times specified in Section 7 1 and 7 2 for receipt of Seller Disclosures and for completion of Bu>cr 
Undertakings to review the content of the disclosures and the outcome of the undertakings The latest applicable date under Section 7 I and 7 2 applies for 
completing a review of Additional Due Diligence matters under Section 7 3 
8 2 If Buyer objects, Buyer and Seller shall have calendar days after receipt of the objections to resolve Buver s objections Seller may but shall 
not be required to, resolve Buyers objections Likewise Buyer is under no obligation to accept any resolution proposed b> Sellei If Buyer s objections are not 
resolved within the stated time, Buyer may void this Contract by providing Seller written notice within the same stated time The holder of the Earnest Monev 
Deposit shall upon receipt of a copy of Buyers written notice return Buyers Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written 
authorization from Seller If this Contract is not voided by Buyer Buyers objection is deemed to have been waived This waiver however does not affect 
warranties under Section 10 
8 3 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure Buver Undertaking or Due Diligence matter within the time 
provided in Section 8 1 that item will be deemed approved by Bu>er 
8 4 Resolution of Buyers objections under Section 8 2 shall be in writing and shall become part of this Contract 
9 SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES This offer is made subject to S^/C /fA k&(Jhuq^ 
The terms of attached Addendum # _J_ are incorporated into this Contract by this reference 
10 SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES Seller s warranties to Buyer regarding the Property are limited to the following 
10 1 When Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer it will be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings 
10 2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing plumbed fixtures cooling heating ventilating electrical and sprinkler 
(both indoor and outdoor), systems appliances, and fireplaces in working order 
10 3 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free ol leaks known to Seller 
10 4 Seller will deliver possession of the Propert) to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Propert) in working order and in compliance 
with governmental regulations, 
10 5 Seller will be responsible for repairing any of Seller s moving-related damage to the Property 
10 6 At Closing, Seller will bring all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing bv Bu>er current and all such 
obligations which Buyer has not so assumed will be discharged, 
10 7 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of a building, environmental or zoning code violation regarding the Property which 
has not been resolved 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS After all contingencies have been removed and before Closing, Buyer may conduct a 
"walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10 I, 10 2, 10 3 and 10 4 are in the warranted 
condition and to venfy that items included in Section 1 1 are presently on the Property If any item is not tn the warranted condition, Seller will correct repair 
or replace it as necessary or, with the consent of Buyer and if required by Lender, escrow an amount at Closing to provide for such repair or replacement 
Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" inspection or to claim during the "walk-through" inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced 
in Section 1 1 or is not in the condition warranted in Section 10 shall constitute a waiver of Buyer's rights under Section I I and of the warranties contained in 
Section 10 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made no new leases entered into and no substantial 
alterations or improvements to the Property shall be undertaken without the prior writtejl consent of Buyer 
13. AUTHOR1 IT OF SIGNERS If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person signing this Contract on its behalf 
warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller and the heirs or successors in interest to Buyer or Seller If Seller is not the vested Owner of 
the Property but has control over the vested Owner's disposition of the Property, Seller agrees to exercise this control and deliver title under this Contract as if it 
had been signed by the vested Owner 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument together with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits and Seller Disclosures constitutes the entire Contract 
between the parties and supersedes all prior dealings between the parties This Contract cannot be changed except by the written agreement of the parties 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the Earnest 
Money Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to mediation in accordance with Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller 
Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation Any Agreement signed by the parties pursuant 
to the mediation shall be binding If mediation fails the procedures applicable and remedies available under this Contract shall apply Nothing in this Section 
shall prohibit Buyer seeking specific performance by Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on Seller by means of summons or as otherwise 
permitted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard to the action provided that Buyer permits Seller to refrain from answering the complaint pending 
mediation Further, the parties may agree in writing to waive mediation 
16. DEFAULT If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money 
Deposit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights If Seller defaults in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from 
Seller as liquidated damages a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit or sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages If Buyer elects to accept the 
liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the 
parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless ol rights which might otherwise be available under common law 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out of this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys fees 
18 DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEV The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it is authorized by (a) Section 7 1, 7 2 and 8 2, (b) 
separate written agreement of the parties, including an agreement under Section 15 if (a) does not apply, or (c) court order 
19. ABROGATION Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing 
20 RISK OF LOSS All risk of loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing 
21. TIME IS OF THE FSSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction Extension must be agreed to in writing by all 
parties Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5 00 P M Mountain Time on the stated date 
22. COUNTERPARTS AND FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS This Contract may be signed in counterparts, and each counterpart bearing an original 
signature shall be considered one document with all others bearing original signature Also, facsimile transmission of any signed original document and re-
transmission of any signed facsimile transmission shall be the same as delivery of an original 
23 ACCEPTANCE Acceptance occurs when Buyer or Seller responding to an offer or counter offer of the other (a) signs the offer or counter offer where 
noted to indicate acceptance and (b) communicates to the other party or the other party s agent that the offer or counter offer has been signed as required 
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions If Seller does not accept this 
offer by SslfrD Q A M Q ^ M Mountain 1 ime /hA.£ H^f / fl , *??& this offer shall lapse and the holder of the Earnest Money 
Dennot shall return it to Buyer ' ' 
Name (please pWtf)/»
 A ' Offer Reference Date ' Phone Number 
J*. 
Buyei 
jr's Name (please POjfltU
 A Utter Reference uate * mone Numoer 
wmJ, 4fo (\ WiQ mdM^^Ab* rt its 
)UNTER0FFFR " W ~ " " ' ACCLPTANCE/REJEC HON/CO R 
• Acceptance of Offer to Purchase Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above 
Sellers Name (please print) Date Time Phone Number 
Seller s Signature Notice Address 
*-» « * - c„ i io, o* ^ t c tUt. fnrppome olfer (Sellers Initials) (Date) (Time) 
~ ~A r^aimn? JK snecified in the attached 
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ADDENDUM NO. / 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
•IIS IS ANjxfADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
i Offer Reference Date of AU&, /& , 19 7 7 . including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
foftSfe^ PP,tfk*T7/*; L.C. as Buyer, and AM&?lCA*U / f e / ^ - U71h4 as SeJIer, 
garriing the Property located at / 5d J~D /jj/^/^ 7 ^ 7 ^ £V ) - U&Zr-'X&WJxff*//jflte 
lowing terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: ' 
Mi^^P^6 P&*>- kittrkB^P rtC )Ar< rW PhAMi PC/FT 
(^P£SVTH &e^ utfr;r ^yyeb/^ 
LLhSi/Vtj ri) fhC itf L*p&y Tmrf 6/j ~Tlf/jp ry hrfh*^ 
j ^ g / ^ F^Af/^f F>/^^r~ fiPffon/*/ Ppj^ Mtt7- ~£itr2&**/* 
n/iz &Hr/fp*csT&/ y?) nuistfr P£JA<? rd Ufc/j/r.. 
the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, not 
Jified by this ADDENDUM^shall remainibe same. j ^ r S e l l e r [ ] Buyer shall have until S*JV [ ] AM p f f W 
jntain Time nVt&^^t / p , . 19 V y t o accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the 
fisions of Section 23oaf the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM sh.all lapses fisions OT aecuon ZAOT me K t ru . unless so accepted, me oner as set Tonn in mis AuutNUUM snail lapse^ , \ 
Buyer [ ] Seller Signature Date Time // [ ] Buyer [ ] SelleCSignap-e TDate Time 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
ICK ONE: 
ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller! ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. 
mature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
•ature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE JUNE 12,1996. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
Counter Offer to Real Estate Purchase contract dated August 16, 1999 including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, between Rochelle Properties LC as Buyer and American Housing Partners Inc. 
as Seller regarding the property located at approximately 7800 So 5300 West, West Jordan, Utah. 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of this Agreement. 
1. EARNEST MONEY 
Buyer shall deposit the sum of $50,000 as Earnest Money Deposit. Said deposit shall 
become non-refundable to Buyer after the lapse of the Due Diligence Period as outlined 
below except for default by seller.. 
2. CLOSING % 
The Closing shall occur within Fourteen (14) days after Seller receives final .site-plan fa/ 
approvals from the City of West Jordan Planning Commiooioft. d/ry lyhAj^Ci'fc, ^ 
3. FINANCIAL CAPABILITY ^ 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties, Buyer shall 
supply to Seller with evidence of financial capability to close on the Property within the 
time frame referenced above. In the event Buyer is unable to provide said evidence, Seller 
shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and neither party shall have any further 
obligation to the other. 
4. DUE DILIGENCE 
Buyer shall complete its investigation ("Due Diligence") within a Twenty One (21) day 
period following execution of this Agreement. Buyer shall remove all contingencies at 
the completion of the Due Diligence Period. Removal of contingencies shall be in writing 
and delivered to Seller on or before the end of the Due Diligence Period. 
PARTIES TO AGREEMENT 
Seller, American Housing Partners, Inc. a Delaware Corporation, and ("Owners"), are 
parties to an Agreement of Purchase and Sale Agreement dated September 9,1998, as 
amended (the "Purchase Agreement55), pursuant to which Seller has agreed to purchase 
and Owners have agreed to sell certain real property, located in the City of West Jordan, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, generally composed of approximately 41 acres of land, located 
approximately 7800 S. 5300 W. 
Buyer (Rochelle Properties LC) and Seller have agreed that, for the price and subject to 
the terms and conditions herein addressed, at Close of Escrow and concurrently with and 
immediately following Seller's acquisition of the Property from Owners, Buyer will 
purchase the Property from Seller and Seller will sell the Property to Buyer 
6. APPROVAL COSTS 
Prior to the date of this Agreement Seller has commenced, and continuing until Close of 
Escrow Seller will continue, to apply for, process and seek to obtain various governmental 
approvals for the development of the Property for residential purposes. Such activities are 
anticipated to benefit and expedite Buyer's use and development of the Property following 
the Close of Escrow, as well as Seller's use and development of the Property if Close of 
Escrow does not occur. Accordingly, in addition to the Purchase Price, at Close of 
Escrow Buyer shall deliver to the Title Company and Title Company shall deliver to Seller 
the amount of the costs and expenses paid or incurred by Seller after September 1,1999, 
with respect to any governmental approvals of the development of the Property for 
residential purposes, such as (without limitation) Civil Engineering, City Processing and 
Permit Fees and Blueprints (the "Approval Costs"). Costs are estimated not to exceed 
$15,000. 
7. SELLER INVESTIGATIONS 
Buyer acknowledges that, pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, Owner has made only 
limited information available to Seller, and since execution and delivery of the Purchase 
agreement Seller has conducted limited investigations with respect to the Property. 
8. REMAINING HOMES AND LOTS 
Buyer hereby acknowledges that Two (2) single family homes currently exist on the 
Property, these are currently assigned lot numbers 68 and 96. Said single family homes 
shall be retained by Seller. In addition, Seller shall retain ownership of One (1) additional 
single family lot (currently lot number 43). Seller shall be responsible for improvement 
costs of said lot. Cost not to exceed $14,000.00, or if Buyer prefers, sales price shall be 
reduced by $14,000 and Buyer shall be responsible for the improvement costs of said lot. 
9. ARMANDO ALVAREZ BROKER, DECLARATION 
Armando Alvarez, Vice President of American Housing Partners Inc is a real Estate 
Broker licensed in the State of Utah and California. 
10. EXTENDED DATE OF ACCEPTANCE 
Extend acceptance of offer dated August 16, 1999 to 5:00 P.M. August 25, 1999 
Buyer shall have 5:00 P.M. Mountain Time August 30, 1999 to accept this Counter Offer. Unless 
so accepted, this Counter Offer shall lapse. 
Seller: 
AMERICAN HOUSING! PARTNERS INC. 
By: Armando Alvarez V.P. 
Date: 8-25-1999 
Buyer: 
ROCHELLE PROPERTIES LC 
Date: <P- lO - ?? 
TabC 
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SINGLE PARTY 
LISTING AND SALE AGREEMENT 
IN CONSIDERATION OF the service agreed to be performed by FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC in 
endeavoring to effect a sale or exchange of the real estate described below in this agreement I hereby grant 
unto FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC the right to sell or exchange said property for a period of 180 days 
from the date hereof and thereafter until withdrawn by written notice 
IF, AT ANY TIME WITHIN SAID PERIOD, FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC procures or presents an offer 
to purchase said property from the registered party listed below, at the price and upon the terms and 
conditions set forth herein, or at any other price or upon any other terms or conditions acceptable to me I 
agree to pay a commission equal to $1,500.00 per lot 
IF AT ANY TIME within the said period FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC procures or presents an offer 
from the registered party listed below, to enter into joint venture or partnership at a price or terms or 
conditions acceptable to me I agree to pay a commission equal to $1,500 00 per lot 
ALL COMMISSIONS shall be due and payable at closing or at the time of consummation of the marriage of 
the joint venture 
IF, within twelve (12) months after expiration of this agreement, the property is acquired by the registered 
party listed below I agree to pay as soon as sale or exchange of said property is consummated, a 
commission to FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC equal to $1,500.00 per lot 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC will be representing both owner and the 
prospective buyer, and owner consents to that dual representation 
IN CASE OF the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement, I agree to pay a 
reasonable attorney s fee and all costs of collection 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC shall have the right to enter said premises at 
any reasonable time of day, for the purpose of inspecting or showing the same to a prospective customer 
THE PROPERTY covered by this agreement is situated in Salt Lake County, Utah, to wit 
Approx 41 acres at 7800 South 5300 West, West Jordan, approx 99 undeveloped lots 
THE SALE PRICE IS $2,277,000.00 
THE TERMS ARE Cash at Closing 
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC HEREBY REGESTERS Rochelle Properties, LC or any of their agents 
or associates as being exposed to the disposition of your property as described above 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned agree to the above terms and acknowledge receipt of a copy of 
this Agreement 
ACCEPTED exclusively for 
FAIRBOWRN COMMERCE INC. Owner 
B Fairbourn, Principal Broker 
August 13, 1999 
(Name) 
(Name) 
TabD 
First 
scunti 
Bank* 
September 10, 1999 
To: American Housing Partners 
Over several years we have been making acquisition and development loans 
to Liberty Homes and the various Rochelle entities. Current commitments 
are in the mid-seven figures. 
T would not expect having difficulty making acquisition and development 
loans in the future, barring something unforeseen in the economy. 
An acquisition and development loan would be subject to committee 
approval, and final plat approval. 
The final plat approval assumes final bonding numbers, confirmed utility 
connections, and alt signatures needed for recording of the plat. 
Sincerely, / y 
Cy Simon 
Construction Loan Officer 
First becunty Bank, U A Mort%aRe Division 1Q0W South Stau* ^trert Sandy, Uiah $4070 
AfimncwH $crmcn company ofFtr?t Security Corporation 
TabE 
Fwst Security 
GOIuK® 
September 17, 1999 
To: American Housing Partners 
Over several years we have been making acquisition and development loans to Liberty 
Homes and the various Rochelle entities. Liberty has existing lines available of 
$5,000,000 for construction loans and improved lot acquisitions. These lines have 
current commitments of $2,199,900. 
In addition, there are other lot loans and A&D loans with total commitments of 
$2,531,500. 
These numbers and commitments should in no way be construed to imply any 
maximum or minimum lending capacity. Each A&D loan is considered on it's own 
merits. 
This type of lending is considered "asset based". Therefore the project itself is an 
important consideration; i.e. costs, configuration, pricing, timing, etc. 
In addition to current commitments, barring something unforeseen in the economy, this 
loan officer does not foresee a problem of First Security Bank lending approximately $4 
million to Liberty or Rochelle for a future project. This would be contingent upon the 
acquisition and development loan receiving committee approval and the project having 
final plat approval. 
The final plat approval assumes final bonding numbers, confirmed utility connections, 
and all signatures needed for recording of the plat. 
We look forward to continuing the excellent relationship we have enjoyed with Liberty 
Homes and the Rochelle entities. 
Sincerely, / / 
Cy Simon / 
Construction Loan Officer 
TabF 
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Supreme Court of Kansas. 
Chester WINKELMAN, Appellee, 
v. 
J. R. ALLEN, Appellant. 
No. 46977. 
March 2, 1974. 
Real estate broker brought action against owner to 
ecover commission on ground that plaintiff, who had 
nonexclusive listing, had produced a purchaser who 
/as ready, willing and able to purchase defendant's 
,000-acre ranch. The Seward District Court, Keaton 
i. Duckworth, J., rendered judgment for plaintiff, 
nd defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
chroeder, J., held that general rule is that an agent or 
roker is entitled to a commission if he both produces 
ready, willing and able buyer and is the efficient 
nd procuring cause of the consummated deal, 
roviding failure to consummate deal is not result of a 
Tongful act of the principal, that an able buyer is one 
rho has financial ability to complete the transaction, 
tat where greater part of funds are to come from a 
drd party who is not bound by or a party to purchase 
p:eement the purchaser cannot be considered one 
nancially able, that broker has the obligation to 
quire into the prospect's financial status, and 
itablish his adequacy to fulfill the monetary 
mditions and that an owner is not estopped to assert 
ck of financial capacity simply because he accepts a 
lyer in the course of negotiations and that, as a 
atter of law, plaintiff had failed to produce a 
ospective purchaser who was financially qualified 
handle the transaction. 
eversed with directions. 
ontron, J., concurred and filed opinion in which 
wsley, J., joined. 
West Headnotes 
| Brokers <S^53 
k53 
| Brokers <@s=>54 
k54 
Brokers <@^63(1) 
k63(l) 
General rule is that a real estate agent or broker is 
entitled to a commission if (a) he produces a buyer 
who is able, ready and willing to purchase on the 
proffered terms or on terms acceptable to the 
principal and (b) is the efficient and procuring cause 
of a consummated deal; both conditions must be met 
before the broker is entitled to commission, however, 
condition (b) is subject to qualification where failure 
in completion of the contract, or closing title, results 
from the wrongful act or interference of the seller. 
[2] Brokers <@^>84(2) 
65k84(2) 
Burden is on a real estate broker, seeking to recover a 
commission, to prove that he obtained a customer 
who was able, ready and willing to meet the terms 
offered by the owner. 
[3] Brokers <§^>54 
65k54 
Where a real estate broker does not produce an able, 
ready and willing buyer on terms acceptable to the 
owner the agent is not entitled to a commission. 
[4] Brokers <®^54 
65k54 
Term "able" within meaning of general rule that a 
real estate broker is entitled to commission if he 
produces a ready, willing and able buyer means more 
than mere mental competency to make a contract or 
physical ability to sign it; term refers to the financial 
ability of the broker-produced purchaser to complete 
the transaction. 
[5] Brokers <@^54 
65k54 
A prospective buyer meets the legal standard of 
"ready, willing and able," to buy, although he does 
not have the cash in hand, if he is able to command 
necessary funds to complete the purchase within the 
time fixed for performance; however, the purchaser 
cannot show ability by depending on third person in 
no way bound to furnish the funds. 
[6] Brokers <@=>54 
65k54 
Where the only available source from which the 
greater part of the money is to come, to make the 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
519 P.2d 1377. 
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purchase of real estate possible by a broker-produced 
customer, is, to the knowledge of the broker, 
admittedly in the ownership and possession of a third 
person, and its use in the interest of the purchaser is 
subject to the gratuitous consent of such third person, 
who is in no way bound by or a party to the purchase 
agreement, such a purchaser cannot be considered 
one able to buy the principal's property. 
[7] Brokers <§^54 
65k54 
Generally speaking, a purchaser of real estate is 
financially ready and able to buy: (1) if he has the 
needed cash in hand or (2) if he is personally 
possessed of assets, which in part may consist of the 
property to be purchased, and a credit rating which 
enables him with reasonable certainty to demand the 
requisite funds at the required time or (3) if he has 
definitely arranged to raise the necessary money or as 
much thereof as he is unable to supply personally by 
obtaining a binding commitment for a loan to him for 
that purpose by a financially able third party. 
[8] Appeal and Error <®^ > 1056.1(6) 
30kl056.1(6) 
[8] Brokers <®^>85(3) 
65k85(3) 
Refusal to permit property owner, in action by broker 
to recover commission, to state whether he 
considered the purchaser obtained by the broker to be 
a qualified buyer was prejudicial error. 
[9] Appeal and Error <&=> 1043(7) 
30kl043(7) 
[9] Pretrial Procedure <®^717.1 
307Ak717.1 
(Formerly 307Ak717, 94k22 
Continuance) 
[9] Pretrial Procedure <®^>724 
307Ak724 
(Formerly 94k43 Continuance) 
Refusal to either grant property owner a one-day 
continuance when weather conditions prevented 
owner's expert witness from being present and 
testifying in broker's suit for commission or to grant 
owner's counsel sufficient time to prepare an affidavit 
of testimony of absent witness was prejudicial error. 
[10] Appeal and Error <S=> 1047(1) 
30kl047(l) 
[10] Pretrial Procedure <@==>3 
307Ak3 
(Formerly 388k9(l)) 
Where the same law firm which represented property 
owner in real estate broker's suit for commission had 
been engaged by broker to prepare contract for sale 
but the firm was not representing owner at time 
contract was prepared, it was prejudicial error to 
overrule owner's motion in limine to suppress any 
evidence concerning broker's seeking counsel of firm 
in preparation of any agreement or contract 
concerning sale of land, on ground that if it was made 
to appear to the jury that the law firm had prepared 
contract as attorney for owner the chance of the jury 
believing owner's testimony was substantially 
reduced. 
[11] Brokers <®=>54 
65k54 
For a real estate broker to be entitled to a commission 
for producing a purchaser "able, ready and willing" to 
purchase the property, the broker has the obligation to 
inquire into the prospect's financial status and to 
establish his adequacy to fulfill the monetary 
conditions of the purchase. 
[12] Brokers <@ >^54 
65k54 
An owner of realty may accept a prospective 
customer without being obligated to make an 
independent inquiry into his financial capacity and is 
not estopped to assert lack of financial capacity, as a 
bar to broker's claim for commission, simply because 
he accepted the buyer in the course of negotiations. 
[13] Brokers <S^54 
65k54 
Regardless of whether a property owner has signed a 
contract, the broker is obligated to produce a 
qualified purchaser before he is entitled to a 
commission. 
[14] Brokers <® >^54 
65k54 
Broker, who had nonexclusive listing contract, was 
not entitled to commission from owner, who sold 
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property to another, where customer procured by 
broker was not financially able to handle the 
transaction, in that clearance of earnest money check 
and check representing balance of down payment 
were dependent on further action by buyer's father to 
guaranty and cosign notes for loans on which checks 
were drawn, buyer himself did not demonstrate that 
le was financially able to complete deal and neither 
3uyerfs father nor any other third party were shown 
o have made any binding commitment toward 
)urchase. 
*22 **1379 Syllabus by the Court 
1. The general rule is that a real estate agent or 
>roker is entitled to a commission if (a) he produces a 
myer who is able, ready and willing to purchase 
ipon the proffered terms or upon terms acceptable to 
he principal; (b) he is the efficient and procuring 
ause of a consummated deal. The latter is subject to 
qualification where failure in completion of the 
ontract, or closing title, results from the wrongful act 
r interference of the principal. 
I. In order for a real estate broker to recover a 
ommission under the rule stated in the foregoing 
ydlabus, the burden is upon the broker to prove that 
e obtained a customer who was able, ready and 
illing to meet the terms offered by the owner. 
>. Where a real estate broker does not produce an 
Die, ready and willing buyer upon terms acceptable 
) the owner, the real estate agent is not entitled to a 
Hnmission. 
. The term 'able1 in the general rule that entitles a 
al estate agent or broker to a commission, if he 
•oduces a buyer who is able, ready and willing to 
irehase upon the proffered terms or upon terms 
iceptable to the principal, in the context of the rule 
eans more than mere mental competence to make a 
>ntract or physical ability to sign it. The term 'able' 
fers to the financial ability of the broker-produced 
irchaser to complete the transaction. 
. A prospective purchaser meets the legal standard 
'ready, willing and able' to buy, although he does 
>t have the cash in hand, if he is able to command 
5 necessary funds to complete the purchase within 
5 time fixed for performance. 
Where the only available source from which the 
sater part of the money is to come, to make the 
rchase of real estate possible by a broker-produced 
stomer, is, to the knowledge of the broker, 
admittedly in the ownership and possession of a third 
person, and its use in the interest of the purchaser is 
subject to the gratuitous consent of such third person, 
who is in no way bound by or a party to the purchase 
agreement, such a purchaser cannot be considered 
one able to buy the principal's property. 
7. Generally speaking, a purchaser of real estate is 
financially ready and able to buy: (1) If he has the 
needed cash in hand, or (2) if he is personally 
possessed of assets-which in part may consist of the 
property to be purchased- and a credit rating which 
enable him with reasonable certainty to command the 
requisite funds at the required time, or (3) if he has 
definitely arranged to raise the necessary money-or as 
much thereof as he is unable to supply *23 
personally-by obtaining a binding commitment for a 
loan to him for that purpose by a financially able 
third party. 
8. For a real estate broker to be entitled to a 
commission for producing a purchaser 'able, ready 
and willing' to purchase the property, the broker has 
the obligation to inquire into the prospect's financial 
status and to establish his adequacy to fulfill the 
monetary conditions of the purchase. With this 
burden cast upon the real estate broker, the owner 
may accept the prospective customer without being 
obligated to make an independent inquiry into his 
financial capacity, and the owner is not estopped to 
assert lack of financial capacity on the part of the 
prospective customer simply because he 'accepted' the 
buyer in the course of negotiations. 
Harold K. Greenleaf, Jr., of Smith & Greenleaf, 
Liberal, argued the cause, and was on the brief for the 
appellant. 
Ted F. Fay, Jr., Hugoton, argued the cause, and 
Bernard E. Nordling, and Leland E. Nordling, 
Hugoton, were with him on the brief for the appellee. 
SCHROEDER, Justice: 
This is an action by a real estate broker to recover a 
commission on the ground that he produced a 
purchaser who was **1380 ready, willing and able to 
purchase the defendant's 9,000 acre South Dakota 
ranch upon terms previously agreed by the parties, 
where the owner who had listed the ranch with the 
broker refused to sign the contract upon tender of the 
down payment. The case was tried to a jury which 
returned a verdict for the broker in the sum of 
$15,000. The defendant has duly perfected an appeal. 
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The action was defended on the ground that the 
broker never produced a qualified purchaser willing 
to meet the terms and conditions upon which the 
owner desired to sell his South Dakota ranch. 
Although numerous points are asserted on appeal our 
decision hinges upon the issue whether the broker 
produced a qualified purchaser. 
In the early part of September, 1970, J. R. Allen 
(defendant-appellant) went to the office of a real 
estate broker, Chester Winkelman (plaintiff-appellee) 
and orally listed his South Dakota ranch consisting of 
approximately 9,000 acres for sale at $40 an acre. 
The total purchase price at $40 per acre figured 
$356,800. During the *24 conversation Winkelman 
informed Allen his commission would be 5% of the 
sale price. Winkelman told the appellant he would 
find a qualified buyer, which meant 'someone able to 
handle it'. The listing of the real estate was non-
exclusive and the listing was not put in writing. 
By reasons of Winkelman's efforts to sell the land he 
found Russell Bird who was interested in the 
property. Winkelman then consulted with Allen and 
procured his authorization to show the ranch in South 
Dakota to Bird. Allen inquired about the prospective 
purchaser and was told by Mr. Winkelman that the 
Bird family were farmers and they were one of the 
most prominent farming families in southwest 
Kansas. 
Russell Bird testified that he was a resident of 
Ellington, Missouri, a farmer, 22 years of age and 
married. He stated his net worth during the months of 
September and October, 1970, was approximately 
$6,000, and that he was working for wages at 
Moscow, Kansas, for $550 per month. He stated for 
the year 1970 his gross wages totaled $7,158, and for 
the year of 1969 his gross wages totaled $5,059. 
Roger Bird is the brother of Russell. The only thing 
in the record concerning Roger is that he 
accompanied Russell and his father to see the South 
Dakota ranch on the second visit. 
Randall Bird is the father of Russell and Roger. 
Randall testified he farmed approximately 5,000 
irrigated acres of land in southwest Kansas, and he 
was a stockman and owned a feed lot with a 2,000 
head capacity. 
Throughout the record there is contusion concerning 
the dates upon which events transpired. The record 
establishes the South Dakota ranch was shown to 
Russell Bird sometime during the middle of 
September 1970, and to Randall Bird, Russell Bird 
and Roger Bird on the second visit, which apparently 
occurred September 24, 1970. Mr. Winkelman was 
the only other person with the Birds on these trips. 
When Mr. Winkelman told Mr. Allen the Birds 
wanted to inspect the South Dakota ranch a second 
time and sought his permission to view the property, 
Mr. Winkelman told Mr. Allen that Russell Bird 
wanted to show the place to his father and brother and 
that they would be working in a 'partnership type 
thing'. 
On the return trip from South Dakota on the second 
occasion, September 25, 1970, Russell Bird offered 
Mr. Winkelman $320,000 *25 for the South Dakota 
ranch upon terms discussed during the return trip. 
The next day, September 26, 1970, Mr. Winkelman 
together with Randall Bird and Russell Bird met with 
Mr. Allen at his farmyard. This was the only occasion 
Allen conferred with the Birds during the entire 
negotiations. 
Mr. Winkelman testified that it was on or about the 
evening of the 26th day of September, 1970, that a 
figure of $340,000 was discussed with Mr. Allen and 
that Mr. **1381 Allen was informed that Mr. 
Winkelman (the Thunderbird Agency) 'had a check 
for $1,000.00 as earnest deposit to hold on it.' He 
then asked Allen 'how he wanted it paid and so on 
and so forth to see if the sale could be worked out.' 
Mr. Winkelman also testified that on the way back 
from the second trip to South Dakota, on or about 
October 6, 1970, Russell Bird made an offer of 
$320,000 with $20,000 down and the purchaser to 
make payments in an amount sufficient to meet the 
Prudential Insurance Company mortgage payments, 
and to pay Mr. Allen $5,000 per year on his equity, 
plus interest on the unpaid portion of his equity, for 
ten years with the balance due and payable at that 
time. This offer was made after Russell conferred 
with his father and brother on the way back from 
South Dakota. 
Prior to Mr. Winkelman taking the Birds to South 
Dakota on the second occasion he had consulted with 
Mr. Allen and had his own attorney prepare a contract 
which is marked defendant's Exhibit No. 1. This 
exhibit is a typewritten contract of sale. It has a blank 
space for the date, a blank space for the description of 
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the real estate and blank spaces in the paragraph 
providing for the terms of payment of the remaining 
balance of $300,000. The significance of this exhibit 
is that the seller is described as J. R. Allen and the 
buyers are collectively described as 'BELLA 
FOURCHE RANCH, INC, (a corporation to be 
formed)'. At the end of this typewritten contract of 
sale is a blank space for the seller's signature and 
three blank spaces for the signatures of the buyers 
followed by 'BELLA FOURCHE RANCH, I N C 
with a blank space for the signature of the one signing 
for the corporation to be formed. 
The purchase price recited in defendant's Exhibit No. 
1 is $320,000, to be paid in the following manner: 
* * * 
'a. Down payment of Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20,000.00), of which One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, *26 shall be deposited with 
Thunderbird Agency Trust Account, Agent for 
SELLER, as earnest money, and Nineteen 
Thousand Dollars ($19,000.00) shall be paid 
upon approval of title or possession date 
whichever comes first. 
*b. The remaining balance of Three Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) to be paid-etc 
ect . . . ' 
In the blank space following is written in pen: 
'$9,500.00 principal per year ($4,500 Ins. $5,000 
Allen) plus int. of 6% on unpaid balance to Allen 
and 7 1/2% int on unpaid balance to Prudential 
Ins. Co. not to exceed 10 yrs to Allen, at which 
time entire balance to him to be paid and Ins. Co. 
Loan to be assumed.' 
The mortgage carried by the Prudential Insurance 
"ompany on the ranch was indicated in the record to 
e $151,000. This indebtedness was to be paid at the 
ate of $4,500 principal year and 7 1/2% interest on 
le unpaid balance. 
Vlr. Winkelman testified the defendant's Exhibit No. 
is the only contract of sale document that he ever 
iscussed with Mr. Allen. 
*Vhen the reduced price was discussed by Mr. 
/inkelman with Mr. Allen he told Allen his 
ommission would be $15,000. Allen would not 
gree to the payment of this sum out of the $20,000 
own payment, and Mr. Winkelman finally said he 
ould take $10,000. The matter was left open when 
Mr. Allen said the payment could be negotiated later. 
At the beginning of the farmyard meeting on the 26th 
day of September, 1970, Mr. Allen assumed he was 
dealing with a qualified purchaser-namely, Randall 
Bird and his son. It was at this meeting Randall Bird 
informed Mr. Allen he was not going to sign the 
contract with his son Russell. James Cook, president 
of the Peoples National Bank, Liberal, Kansas, 
testified he had advised Randall Bird not to sign a 
contract of purchase for the **1382 South Dakota 
ranch because he did not believe it would be 
advisable to have a contingent liability. This 
statement was made by Cook after he testified 
concerning a consultation with Russell Bird and 
Randall Bird, wherein he gave a verbal commitment 
to Russell Bird of $20,000 as the down payment for 
the purchase of the South Dakota ranch, upon the 
condition that Randall Bird would sign a continuing 
guarantee for Russell's indebtedness to the bank. 
At the farmyard meeting on the 26th day of 
September, 1970, Winkelman testified he told Allen 
that Russell Bird was tendering an offer to buy the 
ranch for $320,000, with $20,000 down on the terms 
previously indicated. Allen, having been informed 
that Randall *27 Bird was not going to sign the 
contract, said to Russell Bird, 'Boy, I don't think you 
can make it'. Thereafter Russell Bird replied that be 
believed that he could make it'. Conversation and 
negotiations continued for some period of time that 
afternoon. Indications in the record are that the 
parties were at the Allen farmyard from one and one-
half to two and one-half hours. When Mr. Allen was 
asked in the course of these negotiations whether 
there were any terms in the contract which he wanted 
changed, he replied that he would prefer to receive 
5% of the unpaid balance on his equity each year plus 
interest. Russell Bird was receptive to this change. 
According to Mr. Winkelman the parties did not 
discuss the total price, the payment of the mortgage 
or the down payment at the farmyard meeting of 
September 26th. When asked what Mr. Allen said, if 
anything, after Russell Bird agreed to accept the 
proposed change Mr. Winkelman answered, 'He just 
sort of nodded his head and said 'Okay, or yeah', 
Okay was the word I think he used.' 
Thereafter Mr. Winkelman had a new contract 
prepared by an attorney which incorporated the 
change. This contract is marked plaintiffs Exhibit 
No. 3 and was prepared by the law firm of Smith and 
Greenleaf. Mr. Winkelman testified this contract was 
taken to Allen's farm and given to a woman believed 
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to be one of Mr. Allen's daughters with the request to 
give the contract to Mr. Allen. Mr. Winkelman does 
not know for certain whether the contract was 
actually received by Mr. Allen. Mr. Allen testified 
that he did not receive the contract and knew nothing 
of it. 
Subsequently Mr. Winkelman contacted Mr. Allen 
on several occasions to ascertain whether everything 
in the contract met with his approval. According to 
Mr. Winkelman's testimony the appellant always 
replied that he had not had a chance to examine it. 
Mr. Winkelman believed that in the middle or latter 
part of October 1970, Mr. Allen became reluctant to 
go ahead with the sale and began to hedge. 
Mr. Winkelman testified that in the latter part of 
October 1970, he had a telephone conversation with 
Mr. Allen concerning a four-wheel drive vehicle 
being used on Mr. Allen's Kansas farm, when the 
parties had agreed it was to go with the South Dakota 
ranch. Mr. Allen replied that the track was still his 
until he sold the ranch and he could do what he 
wanted with it until that time. Mr. Winkelman 
testified that he asked Mr. Allen, 'is the deal still on?' 
and Mr. Allen reassured him that it was and not to 
worry. 
*28 Mr. Winkelman learned on the 16th day of 
November, 1970, that Mr. Allen had sold his South 
Dakota ranch to a Mr. Koebler from Lincoln, 
Nebraska, for the sum of $40 per acre. Thereafter, 
Mr. Winkelman on the 18th day of November, 1970, 
had Russell Bird execute a purchase contract 
(plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3) by signing it, which 
contained all of the terms claimed by Mr. Winkelman 
to have been agreed upon by the parties. At the same 
time Russell Bird made a. $19,000 check payable to 
the Thunderbird Agency as the balance of the down 
payment on the ranch. Both the contract and this 
check were given to Mr. Winkelman, who was 
holding the $1,000 earnest money check made 
payable to the Thunderbird Agency. On the same 
**1383 day Russell Bird and Mr. Winkelman went to 
Allen's farm and talked with him in the field where he 
was working cattle. Mr. Winkelman approached Mr. 
Allen and advised him that he had an executed 
contract, a buyer (Russell Bird) and the down 
payment. He then asked Mr. Allen to sign the 
contract, and Mr. Allen refused. 
Mr. Allen testified Mr, Koebler agreed to purchase 
the ranch by contract dated October 1, 1970, and 
executed on October 5, 1970, for the sale price of 
$356,920. 
Two days thereafter, on November 20, 1970, Mr. 
Winkelman filed suit against Mr. Allen for his 
commission. 
Subsequently, Russell Bird also filed suit against Mr. 
Allen for damages. An effort to have these two 
actions consolidated was denied by the trial court. 
There is a sharp conflict in the testimony between 
Mr. Winkelman and Russell Bird on the one hand, 
and Mr. Allen on the other, concerning whether the 
parties had agreed upon the terms of sale. The record 
indicates various matters included in the written 
contracts were never the subject of testimony by the 
witnesses at the trial. The only place these terms are 
found is in the typewritten contracts introduced at the 
trial. For example, plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3 includes 
two tractors which are described in detail, a two-
wheel trailer with stockrack, a working chute, and a 
1963 IHC four-wheel drive pickup. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate any discussion concerning 
this personal property other than the broad statement 
of Russell Bird that 'certain personal property' was to 
go with the sale of the South Dakota ranch, and in 
particular a 1963 International four-wheel drive 
pickup. 
The discrepancies in the testimony were all 
submitted to the jury *29 and resolved against Mr. 
Allen, and for purposes of this appeal it is 
unnecessary to devote further attention to them. 
[1][2][3] The general rule is that a real estate agent 
or broker is entitled to a commission if (a) he 
produces a buyer who is able, ready and willing to 
purchase upon the proffered terms or upon terms 
acceptable to the principal; (b) he is the efficient and 
procuring cause of a consummated deal. (DeYound v. 
Reiling, 165 Kan. 721, 199 P.2d492, Syl. 1; Patee v. 
Moody, 166 Kan. 198, 199 P.2d 798] and Hiniger v. 
Judy, 194 Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305.) 
In Hiniger v. Judy, supra, it was said that the 
conditions specified in both (a) and (b) above must be 
met before the real estate broker is entitled to a 
commission. The condition specified in (b), however, 
is subject to a qualification where failure in 
completion of the contract, or closing title, results 
from the wrongful act or interference of the seller. 
(Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 
A.2d 843, 30 A.L.R.2d 1370 (1967).) 
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We are not concerned on this appeal with a 
discussion of the appellant's rights to sell his property 
through another broker, where a non-exclusive listing 
of the property is given, because the trial court 
instructed on these matters without objection as 
follows: 
* * * 
'Instruction No. 4 
fIf the Defendant prior to the Plaintiffs notifying 
him that he had a purchaser ready, able and 
willing to buy, in good faith sold the land to 
another customer, the Plaintiff cannot recover. In 
order for the Plaintiff to recover, the burden is 
upon him to prove that he obtained a customer 
who was ready, able and willing to meet the terms 
offered by the Defendant prior to the sale of the 
land to another, and so notified the Defendant of 
that fact. One giving a real estate broker 
authority to sell his property upon terms stated, 
but not expressly agreeing that such real estate 
agent shall have the exclusive right to sell, retains 
the right to effect a sale personally or through 
another agent, and the owner may enter into an 
agreement to sell which will be effectual at any 
time before he has actual notice that a purchaser 
**1384 has been procured by the agent who is 
ready, able and willing to purchase under the 
terms of the listing. 
'Instruction No. 5 
fIf you find that the Plaintiff produced a ready 
willing and able purchaser upon terms acceptable 
to Defendant, then you must return a verdict in 
favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of commission 
agreed by the parties. 
'If you find that the Plaintiff did not produce an 
able, ready or willing buyer or that the terms of 
the sale were not agreed to by said buyer and the 
Defendant, then you must find for the Defendant.' 
*30 By giving credence to the findings of the jury 
relative to the conflict in the testimony, we must 
direct our attention on appeal to whether Mr. Allen's 
refusal to execute the contract with Russell Bird was 
the result of Mr. Allen's wrongful act or interference. 
This leads us directly to a consideration of whether 
Russell Bird was a qualified purchaser-the point upon 
which the seller, Mr. Allen, sought to defend in this 
action. 
[4] The term 'able' in the general rule that entitles a 
real estate agent or broker to a commission, if he 
produces a buyer who is able, ready and willing to 
purchase upon the proffered terms or upon terms 
acceptable to the principal, in the context of the rule 
means more than mere mental competence to make a 
contract or physical ability to sign it. We have been 
cited to no Kansas cases dealing with the subject and 
our research on the point has been unavailing. We 
therefore must resort to decisions from other 
jurisdictions to analyze the point. This situation is 
brought about probably because it was so plain that 
financial capacity was the primary ingredient of the 
word. Our opinions appear to have given no 
consideration to the matter of the buyer's financial 
ability to complete the transaction by paying the 
agreed price and taking title to the premises. Nothing 
has been said specifically as to whether it is any part 
of the broker's obligation to present a financially 
capable buyer, nor has anything been said that by 
producing the buyer the broker impliedly represented 
that he was able, in the financial sense, to perform. 
Many jurisdictions leave no doubt that 'able' refers to 
the financial ability of the broker-produced 
purchaser to complete the transaction. In cases 
where the broker sued the owner for commission 
because of alleged unreasonable refusal to enter into a 
contract of sale with the proffered willing and able 
customer, it was held that as a condition precedent to 
recovery, the broker was required to establish that his 
customer was financially able not only to make the 
initial payment required on execution of the contract, 
but also to have available the requisite funds to 
complete the undertaking at the time fixed for 
performance. (Ellsworth .dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 
supra, and the many authorities cited therein.) 
[5] The ability to buy refers to the financial ability of 
the purchaser. A prospective buyer meets the legal 
standard of 'ready, willing and able' to buy, although 
he does not have the cash in hand, if he is able to 
command the necessary funds to complete the 
purchase within the time allowed by the offer. (C. O. 
Frick Co. v. Baetzel, *31 71 Ohio App. 301, 47 
N.R2d 1019 (1942); and Walton v. Hudson, 82 Ohio 
App. 330, 79 N.E.2d 921 (1947).) While the 
authorities are not in agreement as to the degree of 
proof required to show financial ability to pay, most 
authorities do|gjij:equire the purchaser to have in his 
possession the funds necessary to close the deal at the 
time the contract is entered into. But it must be 
shown that the purchaser is able to command the 
necessary funds to close the deal on the date agreed 
upon. (Walton v. Hudson, supra.) The term 
command is important. The word command means 
'To have control of (Webster's International 
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Dictionary 2d Ed.) The cases uniformly hold that the 
purchaser cannot show ability by depending upon 
third persons in no way bound to furnish **1385 the 
funds. (Welch v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 5 
IU.App.2d 568, 126 N.E.2d 165.) 
[6] A purchaser without the ability to finance the 
purchase is no purchaser at all. Where the only 
available source from which the greater part of the 
money is to come to make the purchase possible is, to 
knowledge of the broker, admittedly in the ownership 
and possession of a third person, and its use in the 
interest of the purchaser is subject to the gratuitous 
consent of such third person who is in no way bound 
by or a party to the purchase agreement, such a 
purchaser cannot be considered one able to buy the 
principal's property. Such funds cannot be 
considered assets of the purchaser. (McGarry v. 
McCrone, 97 Ohio App. 543, 118 N.E.2d 195; 
Morere v. Dixon Real Estate Co., 188 So.2d 623 
(La.App.1966), and the many authorities cited 
therein; and DeHarpport v. Green, 215 Or. 281, 333 
P.2d 900 (1959).) 
[7] An excellent discussion of the purchaser's 
financial ability to buy in connection with a real 
estate transaction is made by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota in Shell Oil Co. v. Kapler, 235 Minn. 292, 
50 N,W.2d 707 (1951), where the court said: 
* * * 
'Rules for testing a purchaser's financial ability to 
buy are not to be reduced to any unyielding 
formula, but must be flexible enough to 
accomplish their purpose according to the 
particular facts of each case. In ascertaining the 
rules reflected by an endless variety of cases, it is 
particularly important to bear in mind that no 
decision is authoritative beyond the scope of its 
controlling facts. Difficulty in both stating and 
applying the rules stems principally from a failure 
to keep in mind that their purpose-the protection 
of good faith sellers as well as of bona fide 
purchasers, brokers, and other persons similarly 
situated-is to establish a purchaser's financial 
ability to buy with reasonable certainty. A 
purchaser may not have the necessary cash in 
hand, but that alone, it is recognized, *32 does 
not disqualify him if he is otherwise so situated 
that he is reasonably able to command the 
requisite cash at the required time. On the other 
hand, the seller is not required to part with his 
property to a purchaser whose financial ability 
rests upon nothing more than shoestring 
speculation or upon attractive probabilities which 
fall short of reasonable certainty. In short, the 
rules are designed to protect the seller by binding 
him to a sale only where there is a reasonable 
certainty of the purchaser's financial ability to pay 
and, on the other hand, to protect the purchaser-
and persons similarly situated-from a technical, 
insubstantial, or sharp-dealing disqualification. 
'2-3. Generally speaking, a purchaser is 
financially ready and able to buy: (1) If he has the 
needed cash in hand, or (2) if he is personally 
possessed of assets-which in part may consist of 
the property to be purchased-and a credit rating 
which enable him with reasonable certainty to 
command the requisite funds at the required time, 
or (3) if he has definitely arranged to raise the 
necessary money-or as much thereof as he is 
unable to supply personally-by obtaining a 
binding commitment for a loan to him for that 
purpose by a financially able third party, 
irrespective of whether such loan be secured in 
part by the property to be purchased. Although 
no precise line of demarcation between the 
application of the second and third divisions of 
the above rule can be laid down for all cases, it is 
clear-in the light of the purpose of the rule-that 
where the purchaser relies primarily, not upon his 
own personal assets, but upon the proceeds of a 
contemplated loan or loans to be made to him by 
a third party, he is financially able to buy only if 
he has a definite and binding commitment from 
such thirdparty loaner. Even though the third 
party is financially able, his promise is of no avail 
unless made for an adequate consideration. A 
purchaser who personally has little, if any, cash 
or other assets **1386 must establish that the 
financial crutches to be loaned him by others are 
both legally and financially dependable.' (pp. 
297, 298, 299, 50 N.W.2d pp. 712, 713.) 
In Potter v. Ridge Realty Corporation, 28 
Conn.Super. 304, 259 A.2d 758 (1969) the purchaser 
was solely dependent upon third persons who were in 
no way bound to furnish him funds to qualify as an 
able purchaser. There the court said that even if the 
parents of the purchaser's wife had in fact been shown 
to have had funds available to take over and assist in 
the transaction, entirely or a necessary part, the 
purchaser still would not qualify for the status of an 
'able' purchaser within the meaning of the rule. 
Turning now to the facts in the instant case, it was 
established by the testimony of Russell Bird himself 
that the two checks given by him to the Thunderbird 
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Agency (the $1,000 earnest money check and 
the.$ 19,000 check for the balance of the down 
payment) at the time they were tendered by the 
appellee to the appellant on November 18, 1970, 
were not covered by funds on deposit in the bank 
upon which they were drawn. In other words, the 
clearance of these checks through the bank was 
dependent upon further action by Randall Bird, the 
father of Russell Bird, to guarantee and *33 cosign 
the notes of Russell for the loans at the Plains State 
Bank upon which they were drawn. Arrangements 
had previously been made at the Plains State Bank in 
Plains, Kansas, where the cashier, Mr. Bender, had 
'tentatively agreed' to make a loan for the down 
payment in the amount of $20,000, and similarly the 
bank had 'tentatively agreed' to see Russell Bird 
through the first year and loan him approximately 
$8,000 for living expenses. At the time of the tender 
to the appellant no legally binding commitment had 
been made by either Russell Bird or Randall Bird at 
the Plains State Bank for the money to cover these 
checks. 
Analyzing the terms of the contract set forth in 
plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, Russell Bird was obligated 
to pay on the Prudential Insurance Company of 
America's first mortgage, in the amount of $151,000 
$4,500 principal per year plus interest in the amount 
of 7 1/2% on the unpaid balance. On the $149,000 
balance due to the appellant Russell Bird would be 
obligated the first year to pay $8,940 interest and 
$7,450 principal. The grand total of fixed obligations 
due under the contract of purchase for the first year, 
therefore, would be $32,215, in addition to the 
$20,000 down payment Russell Bird was obligated to 
borrow, and for which he had no binding 
commitment. 
The testimony was that 1,700 head of cattle would be 
put on the South Dakota ranch after its purchase. If 
Russell Bird were to purchase these cattle, 
presumably stocker cattle, they would in all 
likelihood cost a minimum of approximately $200 per 
head, for a total of $340,000. all of this would have to 
be borrowed capital. If this court could take judicial 
notice of interest rates for the year of 1971, the 
interest rate would exceed 8% on $340,000. 
It is to be noted the contract of sale, marked 
defendant's Exhibit No. 1, had penned notations with 
respect to the payment of the remaining balance of 
$300,000, indicating that the Prudential Insurance 
Company mortgage would not be assumed by the 
buyer until after the payment of the first ten annual 
installments were paid to the appellant. This was the 
only written document admitted by the appellee to 
have been discussed with the appellant. 
[8] In the appellant's attempt to defend this action on 
the ground that Russell Bird was not a qualified 
purchaser, he was asked by his counsel on direct 
examination whether he considered Russell Bird, the 
son, as a qualified buyer. Opposing counsel objected 
to such testimony on the ground that it invaded the 
province of the *34 jury, and the trial court sustained 
the objection, thereby precluding the appellant from 
testifying on the subject. This was highly prejudicial 
to the appellant in the trial of this lawsuit. 
**1387 [9] Similarly the appellant's expert witness, 
Mr. Richard Wood of Erie, Kansas, president of the 
Kansas Association of Realtors, at the last minute 
could not be present for trial. The weather had closed 
in and made travel to the place of trial either by road 
or air impossible. The appellant's counsel by motion 
requested a one day continuance which the trial court 
denied. The appellant's counsel then requested 
sufficient time to prepare an affidavit as to the 
testimony of his absent expert witness as required by 
K.S.A. 60-240(c). This motion was presented on the 
last day of trial after the appellee had presented his 
evidence and there was no opportunity to prepare the 
affidavit without leave of court. The trial court denied 
counsel for the appellant his only opportunity to file 
an affidavit. 
The appellant argues in his brief that it was crucial to 
his case that expert testimony be presented as to the 
standards of the real estate industry concerning a 
'qualified buyer' of both farm and ranch lands. The 
appellant contended in his petition and it is set forth 
in the pre-trial order that the prospective purchaser, 
Russell Bird, a person of 22 years of age with a net 
worth of $6,000 was in no way a qualified buyer. 
The trial court's denial of the appellant's motion was 
on the ground that the appellant had not subpoenaed 
Mr. Wood. Mr. Wood was not a hostile witness but a 
willing witness who volunteered to come without the 
issuance of a subpoena. We think this ruling of the 
trial court further prejudiced the appellant in the trial 
of this lawsuit. 
The foregoing rulings of the trial court substantially 
eliminated or reduced the effectiveness of the defense 
that Russell Bird was not a qualified buyer within the 
standards of the real estate industry, and that he was 
not considered a qualified buyer at the time by the 
appellant. 
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[10] The appellant was also prejudiced when his 
motion, termed a motion In Limine, was overruled. 
The written contract identified as plaintiffs Exhibit 
No. 3 was prepared by the law firm of Smith and 
Greenleaf according to the testimony of the appellee 
before the jury. This either appeared to the jury, or 
could have appeared to the jury, that the firm of 
Smith and Greenleaf, who was representing the 
appellant at the trial in this case, had prepared the 
contract as *35 an attorney for the appellant in the 
sequence of events. This was not the case. At the 
time Smith and Greenleaf prepared plaintiffs Exhibit 
No. 3 they were not aware there was a controversy 
between Winkelman and Allen or between Allen and 
Russell Bird. At the time the plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3 
was prepared Allen, the appellant, was not 
represented by counsel. Thus, if it was made to 
appear to the jury that the appellant had counsel who 
prepared plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, the chances of the 
jury believing the testimony of the appellant were 
substantially reduced. The appellant's motion was to 
suppress any and all evidence concerning 
Winkelmaris seeking counsel of the firm of Smith and 
Greenleaf in the preparation of any agreements or 
contracts concerning the sale of subject lands. The 
motion alleged such evidence would be prejudicial 
and inflammatory to the defense of Mr. Allen. Failure 
of the trial court to sustain the appellant's motion In 
Limine to avoid giving the jury this impression was 
prejudicially interjected into a lawsuit. This evidence 
is made even more prejudicial when Mr. Winkelman 
testified that a 'smooth agreement' was prepared. 
It is argued by the appellee that the appellant 
accepted Russell Bird as a purchaser on the 26th day 
of September, 1970, at the farmayard meeting 
between the parties. Therefore, it is argued Russell 
Bird's qualifications to purchase the ranch and his 
financial means to do so are immaterial. 
The appellee cites no authority whatever for the 
position taken in his brief that not only was Russell 
Bird a qualified buyer, but that Mr. Allen accepted 
him as a qualified buyer. 
**1388 An analysis of cases from other jurisdictions 
clearly indicates that the rule regarding the 
acceptance of a prospective buyer by the owner is 
undergoing change. The leading case on the subject 
which has been followed or approved by numerous 
other jurisdictions in this country is Ellsworth Dobbs, 
Inc. v. Johnson, supra. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court changed its earlier rule in a well reasoned 
opinion stating as follows: 
The early cases in our State implicitly imposed on 
the owner the burden of inquiry or investigation of 
the financial ability of the person produced as a 
prospective buyer. They said that if the owner 
accepted the purchaser brought by the broker and 
executed a contract to sell to him, that ended the 
matter as far as the broker's right to commission was 
concerned. For example, in Courter v. Lydecker, 71 
N.J.L. 511, 513, 58 A. 1093 (Sup.Ct.1904), where the 
purchaser defaulted and title did not pass, the court 
held the owner liable for commission, saying: 
*36 "In the present case the broker obtained a 
purchaser willing to conclude a bargain upon the 
terms upon which the broker was authorized to sell, 
who was acceptable to-for he was accepted by-the 
vendor.' (Emphasis ours.) Likewise in Freeman v. 
Van Wagenen, supra, (90 N.J.L. 358, 101 A. 55 
(Sup.Ct.1971)), after referring to the rule that the 
broker's burden was 'no more than to negotiate a sale 
by finding a purchaser upon satisfactory terms' (he 
Supreme Court said: 'This the plaintiff did, the 
defendants actually accepted Scherer as satisfactory.' 
90 N.J.L., atp. 361, 101 A. at p. 56. 
'Later, more unqualified statements began to appear 
with respect to the effect on the broker's commission 
claim of the buyer's inability to complete the contract. 
It was declared that if the broker in good faith 
produces a prospective purchaser who is accepted by 
the seller, and a contract of sale made between the 
two, the purchaser's ability to perform was no longer 
open to question. To illustrate, in Matz v. Bessman, 1 
N.J.Misc. 5 (Sup.Ct.1923), the broker produced a 
buyer who, the court said, was 'plainly satisfactory' 
because the owner contracted with him. When it 
developed that the buyer was financially unable to 
take title, the owner was held responsible for 
commission because he had 'accepted' the buyer, and 
'the broker was not an insurer of either the solvency 
or the willingness of the customer.' 
'In Brindley v. Brook, 10 N.J. Misc. 612, 160 A. 398 
(Sup.Ct.1932) it was said that by contracting with the 
purchaser presented by the broker, the owner 
accepted him as satisfactory, and whether the 
purchaser was able ultimately to comply with the 
terms of the agreement 'was of no concern' to the 
broker. He had earned his commission. Thereafter a 
series of cases projected the rule that once the seller 
accepted a buyer by entering into a contract of sale, 
he must be considered to have accepted the financial 
ability of the buyer to perform, and the broker, who 
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acted in good faith, was entitled to his commission 
even though the buyer eventually proved to be 
financially unable to perform; it is immaterial whose 
fault it was that the final settlement did not take place. 
Hatch v. Dayton, 130 N.J.L. 425, 33 A.2d 350 
(Sup.Ct.1943); Richard V. Failed, supra (13 
NJ.Super. 534, 81 A.2d 17 (App.Div.1951)); Winter 
v. Toldt, supra (32 NJ.Super. 443, 108 A.2d 648 
(App.Div.1954)); Hedden v. Folio, supra (62 
NJ.Super. 470, 163 A.2d 163 (App.Div.1960)). 
'In order to complete the portrayal of the evolution of 
the current state of the law respecting the right of the 
real estate broker to commission, it must be noted that 
all of the cases from Hinds v. Henry (36 N.J.L. 328) 
through Blau v. Friedman (26 NJ. 397, 140 A.2d 
193) recognize that by the use of appropriate 
language the ownerseller, in engaging the broker, may 
make his liabilty for commission depend specifically 
upon the closing of title and receipt by the seller or 
the consideration. The effectiveness and practicability 
of this as a safeguard measure for the property owner 
will be discussed hereafter. 
**1389 '(1) We pause at this point to explain that a 
primary reason for granting certification in this case 
was to re-evaluate the justice and propriety of 
continuing the legal principles outlined above. Is it 
just to permit a broker to recover commission from an 
owner simple because he entered into a contract on 
mutually agreeable terms with a buyer produced by 
the broker, when it later develops that the buyer 
cannot or will not complete the transaction by closing 
the title? We do not think so. 
'A new and more realistic approach to the problem is 
necessary. 
*37 There can be no doubt that ordinarily when an 
owner of property lists it with a broker for sale, his 
expectation is that the money for the payment of 
commission will come out of the proceeds of the sale. 
He expects that if the broker produces a buyer to 
whom the owner's terms of sale are satisfactory, and a 
contract embodying those terms is executed, the 
buyer will perform i. e. he will pay the consideration 
and accept the deed at the time agreed upon. 
Considering the realities of the relationship created 
between owner and broker, that expectation of the 
owner is a reasonable one, and, in our view, entirely 
consistent with what should be the expectation of a 
conscientious broker as to the kind of ready, willing 
and able purchaser his engagement calls upon him to 
tender to the owner. 
'(2) The present New Jersey rule as exemplified by 
the cases cited above is deficient as an instrument of 
justice. It permits a broker to satisfy his obligation to 
the owner simply by tendering a human being who is 
physically and mentally capable of agreeing to buy 
the property on mutually satisfactory terms, so long as 
the owner enters into a sale contract with such person. 
The implication of the rule is that the owner has the 
burden of satisfying himself as to the prospective 
purchaser's ability, financial or otherwise, to complete 
the transaction; he cannot rely at all on the fact that 
the purchaser was produced in good faith by the 
broker as a person willing and able to buy the 
property. Once he enters into a contract of sale with 
the broker's customer, he is considered to have 
accepted the purchaser as fully capable of the 
ultimate performance agreed upon. If it later appears 
that the purchaser is not financially able to close the 
title, or even that he never did have the means to do 
so, the owner must pay the broker his commission, so 
long as he acted in good faith. Such a rule, 
considered in the context of the real relationship 
between broker and owner, empties the word 'able' of 
substantially all of its significant content and imposes 
an unjust burden on vendors of property. It seems to 
us that fairness requires that the arrangement between 
broker and owner be interpreted to mean that the 
owner hires the broker with the expectation of 
becoming liable for a commission only in the event a 
sale of the property is consummated, unless the title 
does not pass because of the owner's improper or 
frustrating conduct. 
'(3) The principle that binds the seller to pay 
commission if he signs a contract of sale with the 
broker's customer, regardless of the customer's 
financial ability, puts the burden on the wrong 
shoulders. Since the broker's duty to the owner is to 
produce a prospective buyer who if financially able to 
pay the purchase price and take title, a right in the 
owner to assume such capacity when the broker 
presents his purchaser ought to be recognized. It 
follows that the obligation to inquire into the 
prospect's financial status and to establish his 
adequacy to fulfill the monetary conditions of the 
purchase must be regarded logically and sensibly as 
resting with the broker. Thus when the broker 
produces his customer, it is only reasonable to hold 
that the owner may accept him without being 
obligated to make an independent inquiry into his 
financial capacity. That right ought not to be taken 
away from him, nor should he be estopped to assert it, 
simply because he 'accepted' the buyer, i. e., agreed 
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to convey to him if and when he paid the purchase 
price according to the terms of the contract In reason 
and injustice it must be **1390 said that the duty to 
produce a purchaser able in the financial sense to 
complete the purchase at the tune fixed is an incident 
of the broker's busmess, so too, with regard to *38 
any other material condition of the agreement to 
purchase which is to be performed at the closing In 
a practical world, the true test of a willing buyer is 
not met when he signs an agreement to purchase, it is 
demonstrated at the time of closing of title, and if he 
unjustifiably refuses or is unable financially to 
perform then, the broker has not produced a willing 
buyer 
'A lucid and realistic explanation of the relationship 
between an intending vendor of real property and 
the broker appears in the opinion of Denning, L J in 
Dennis Reed, Ltd v Goody, (1950) 2 K B 277, pp 
284-285, 1 All Eng Rep (1950) 919, 923 
"When a house owner puts his house mto the hands 
of an estate agent, the ordinary understanding is that 
the agent is only to receive a commission if he 
succeeds m effecting a sale, but if not, he is entitled 
to nothing That has been well understood for the last 
100 years or more * * * The agent m practice takes 
what is a busmess risk he takes on himself the 
expense of preparing particulars and advertising the 
property m return for the substantial remuneration-
reckoned by a percentage of the pnce-which he will 
receive if he succeeds in finding a purchaser * * *" 
(pp 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 236 A 2d p 851, 852, 
853, 854) 
Some jurisdictions have always had the rule 
announced in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc v Johnson, 
supra (See Anno 74 A L R 2 d 437, 452) Other 
jurisdictions are following New Jersey's lead 
Decisions which have either adopted or expressly 
approved Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc v Johnson, supra, 
are Setser v Commonwealth, Inc , 256 Or 11, 470 
P 2d 142 (1970), Staab v Messier, 128 Vt 380, 264 
A 2d 790 (1970), Potter v Ridge Realty Corporation, 
supra, Rogers v Hendrix, 92 Idaho 141, 438 P2d 
653 (1968), and Mullenger v Clause, 178 N W 2 d 
420 (Iowa 1970) For a comprehensive discussion of 
the New Jersey case see Note, 23 Rutgers L Rev 83 
(1968), Note, 9 Ariz L Rev 519 (1968), Note, 17 
CathULRev 487 (1968), and Note, 10 Wm & 
Mary L Rev 240(1968) 
[11][12][13] We are persuaded by the cogent 
reasoning in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc v Johnson, supra, 
and adopt the rules stated m the above quoted portion 
thereof as the law m Kansas 
On the facts in the mstant case the appellant did not 
sign the contract tendered by the appellee Factually, 
therefore, the case presently before us does not 
mvolve an executed contract wherein the purchaser 
subsequently defaults because he is financially unable 
to perform But m either situation the broker is 
obligated to produce a qualified purchaser before he 
is entitled to a commission The argument that the 
appellant 'accepted' Russell Bird during the course of 
negotiations, and m particular on the 26th day of 
September, 1970, when the appellee claims the 
appellant accepted him as a purchaser, is not availing 
to the broker, Mr Winkelman *39 The 'acceptance' 
of Russell Bud by the appellant did not constitute a 
waiver on the appellant's part of the financial ability 
of Russell Bird to purchase the property The burden 
is upon the appellee, the broker, to show that he has 
produced an able buyer m the financial sense 
Accordmgly, the appellant is not estopped to assert m 
defense of this action that Russell Bird was not a 
qualified purchaser 
The trial court properly instructed the jury the burden 
of proof was upon the broker 'to prove that he 
obtamed a customer who was ready, able and willing 
to meet the terms offered by the defendant prior to the 
sale of the land to another, and so notified the 
defendant of that fact' The jury was also instructed 
that if the broker 'did not produce an able, ready and 
willing buyer' the jury must find for the defendant, 
Mr Allen The jury was given no instruction 
concerning an 'acceptance' of the prospective 
purchaser by the owner 
Mr Winkelman, the appellee, admitted in his 
testimony on cross-examination that **1391 when the 
appellant orally listed his South Dakota ranch with 
him for sale he agreed to find a qualified buyer, 
which meant 'someone able to handle it' 
[14] Accordmgly, under the foregoing rules and 
upon the record here presented, the appellee did not, 
as a matter or law, produce a prospective purchaser 
who was qualified financially to handle the 
transaction The appellee by his own evidence on the 
trial of this action failed m his burden of proof on this 
pomt The trial court should have entered judgment 
for the defendant, Mr Allen, on his motion for a 
directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs evidence 
In view of the foregoing other pomts asserted by the 
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appellant in his brief for reversal of the judgment 
have become immaterial. 
The judgment of the lower court is reversed with 
directions to enter judgment for the appellant, J. R. 
Allen. 
FONTRON, Justice (concurring): 
It is my feeling that this case should be returned for a 
new trial. The evidence, as I view it, presents a 
question of fact as to whether an able qualified buyer 
was produced in the person of Russell Bird. My 
conclusion is based largely on the testimony of James 
Cook, the president of a Liberal bank, and of Randall 
Bird, Russell's father. Mr. Cook testified he gave 
Russell a verbal commitment for the $20,000 down 
payment, while Randall Bird stated on the stand he 
was going to back his son in the ranching adventure, 
intended to help him if need be, was willing to co-*40 
sign notes or guarantee notes at the bank, and was 
planning to put some cattle in South Dakota himself. 
In the face of the foregoing evidence I believe the 
court goes too far in saying that as a matter of law 
that Mr. Winkelman failed to produce an able or 
qualified buyer for Mr. Allen's land. 
OWSLEY, J., joins in the foregoing concurring 
opinion. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Minnesota. 
SHELL OIL CO. 
v. 
KAPLER et al. 
No. 35584. 
Dec. 21, 1951. 
Action by Shell Oil Company against George R. 
Kapler, and others, to compel specific performance of 
a lease option providing for the purchase of a 
gasoline station. The District Court, Hennepin 
County, John A. Weeks, J., made an order granting a 
new trial, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Matson, J., held that exclusion of evidence of the 
1950 evaluation of the property for the purpose of 
establishing the probability that a third person could 
borrow the required cash to purchase for a greater 
price than that offered under the option was 
immaterial and not prejudicial, and that specific 
performance of the option would not be inequitable. 
Order reversed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Landlord and Tenant <§^92(1) 
233k92(l) 
Jnder lease giving lessee first option to buy at price 
md on terms agreed to by third person able, willing 
md ready to buy, rules for testing purchaser's 
inancial ability to purchase were not to be reduced to 
my unyielding formula but were required to be 
lexible enough to accomplish their purpose 
ccording to particular facts. 
2] Landlord and Tenant <@^>92(1) 
33k92(l) 
Jnder lease giving lessee first option to purchase at 
rice and on terms agreed to by third person able, 
Hilling and ready to purchase, purpose of rules for 
isting purchaser's financial ability to purchase realty 
ras to protect good- faith vendors as well as bona 
de purchasers, brokers, and other persons similarly 
tuated and to establish purchaser's financial ability 
i buy with reasonable certainty. 
] Landlord and Tenant <@^>92(1) 
»3k92(l) 
Under lease giving lessee first option to purchase at 
price and on terms agreed to by third person able, 
willing and ready to purchase, purchaser was not 
required to have necessary cash on hand, but that 
alone did not disqualify him if he was otherwise so 
situated that he was reasonably able to command 
requisite cash at required time. 
[4] Landlord and Tenant <@==>92(1) 
233k92(l) 
Under lease giving lessee first option to purchase at 
price and on terms agreed to by third person able, 
willing and ready to purchase, vendor was not 
required to part with his property to purchaser whose 
financial ability rested upon nothing more than 
shoestring speculation or upon attractive probabilities 
falling short of reasonable certainty. 
[5] Landlord and Tenant <®=^92(1) 
233k92(l) 
Where lease gave lessee first option to purchase at 
price and on terms agreed to by third person able, 
willing and ready to purchase, rules for testing 
financial ability of third person were designed to 
protect vendor by binding him to sale only where 
there was reasonable certainty of purchaser's financial 
ability to pay and to protect purchaser and persons 
similarly situated from technical, insubstantial or 
sharp-dealing disqualification. 
[6] Landlord and Tenant <®=>92(1) 
233k92(l) 
Under lease giving lessee first option to purchase at 
price and on terms agreed to by third person able, 
willing and ready to purchase, purchaser was 
financially ready and able if he had needed cash in 
hand or was personally possessed of assets which 
might partly consist of property to be purchased and 
credit rating enabling him with reasonable certainty to 
command requisite funds at required time or had 
definitely arranged to raise necessary money or as 
much as he was unable to supply personally by 
obtaining binding commitment for loan by financially 
able third party regardless of whether loan was 
secured in part by property to be purchased, 
[7] Landlord and Tenant <@=*92(1) 
233k92(l) 
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Under lease giving lessee first option to purchase at 
price and on terms agreed to by third person able, 
willing and ready to purchase, purchaser who relied 
primarily, not upon his own personal assets, but upon 
proceeds of contemplated loan or loans to be made to 
him by third party was financially able only if he had 
definite and binding commitment from third party. 
[8] Landlord and Tenant <§^>92(1) 
233k92(l) 
Under lease giving lessee first option to purchase at 
price and on terms agreed to by third person able, 
willing and ready to purchase, promise of purchaser 
relying upon proceeds of contemplated loan to be 
made to him by third party to enable him to complete 
purchase did not amount to binding commitment 
unless made for adequate consideration even though 
third party was financially able. 
[9] Specific Performance <®^>120 
358kl20 
In action against lessors to compel specific 
performance of lease containing option to purchase 
gasoline station, where lessors claimed right to sell to 
third person who made good faith offer at higher 
price, and purchaser personally possessed only $100 
of $35,000 cash required and had no other assets and 
relied upon loans to be obtained from father and 
brother and from corporation without binding 
commitment, lessors' evidence of current valuation of 
the property was immaterial and not admissible to 
show probability that third party could borrow 
required cash. 
[10] New Trial <&=>41(2) 
275k41(2) 
In action against lessors to compel specific 
performance of lease containing option to purchase 
gasoline station wherein lessors claimed right to sell 
to third person for higher price than that offered 
under option, exclusion of immaterial evidence of 
current valuation of property for purpose of showing 
that third party would be able to borrow required cash 
caused no prejudice that would justify granting of 
new trial. 
[11] Witnesses <@^331.5 
410k331.5 
(Formerly410k3311/2) 
In action against vendors to compel specific 
performance of lease containing option to purchase 
gasoline station, evidence of 1950 valuation of 
property had no material bearing on credibility of any 
witnesses and was not admissible on that ground. 
[12] Evidence <®^53 
157k53 
[12] E v i d e n c e d 89 
157k89 
A presumption is merely a procedural device for 
controlling burden of going forward with evidence 
and has no additional function other than limited one 
of dictating decision where there is an entire lack of 
competent evidence to the contrary, and the moment 
substantial countervailing evidence appears from any 
source, presumption vanishes completely, and case is 
to be decided by trier of fact as if it had never existed. 
[13] Specific Performance <S^119 
358kll9 
In action against lessors to compel specific 
performance of lease containing option to purchase 
gasoline station wherein lessors claimed right to sell 
to third party who offered higher price than that 
offered under the option, presumption that purchaser 
was solvent and able to perform obligations of 
contract disappeared under evidence that he had but 
$100 in cash and no other assets to apply to $35,000 
offer and had promises from oil company to loan 
$25,000 and assurance from father and brother to 
loan $10,000, but no binding commitments. 
[14] Witnesses <©==> 144(2) 
410kl44(2) 
If decedent was party to conversation, court was 
required to strike as inadmissible the testimony of 
other parties to conversation who were interested in 
outcome of the action. M.S. A. § 595.04. 
[15] Trial <@==>4 
388k4 
In action against lessors to compel specific 
performance of lease containing option to purchase 
gasoline station, where lessors claimed that plaintiffs' 
representative at discussion of renewal of lease had 
made misrepresentation, interrogatory as to whether 
one lessor, since deceased, was present when 
defendants met with plaintiffs representative was 
properly submitted since if misrepresentation had 
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been found, trial court would have been required to 
know if decedent was present and, to strike testimony 
of other parties to the conversation who were 
interested in the outcome. M.S.A. § 595.04. 
[16] Appeal and Error <®=»1011.1(1) 
30kl011.1(l) 
(Formerly 30kl011(1)) 
Supreme Court as an appellate court does not make or 
amend findings or even direct that it be done where 
facts are in dispute. 
[17] Appeal and Error <&=>1175(1) 
30kl 175(1) 
Where any issue is settled as a matter of law by the 
record, the case having been fully developed at trial, 
Supreme Court will determine question of law and 
thereby avoid delay and expense of further litigation. 
[18] Appeal and Error <&==> 1129 
30kll29 
Supreme Court has policy of determining merits of a 
case whenever it can be done with due regard to 
limitations arising from nature of appellate 
jurisdiction. 
[19] Specific Performance <@=» 121(8) 
358kl21(8) 
In action against lessors to compel specific 
performance of lease containing option to purchase 
gasoline station, where jury upon conflicting evidence 
specifically found that plaintiffs representative made 
no material misrepresentation at time defendants 
entered into the lease, specific performance could not 
:>e denied on ground of misrepresentation. 
20] Specific Performance <S^51 
!58k51 
Generally, fairness of contract is to be determined in 
ight of circumstances that existed at time of its 
naking rather than by effect of subsequent events 
vhich intervene before specific performance is 
ought. 
21] Specific Performance c®^:>49.2 
58k49.2 
(Formerly 358k49(2)) 
.dequacy or inadequacy of consideration for 
property sold is to be determined at inception of 
contract rather than according to increased or 
decreased value of property at time of trial of action 
for specific performance. 
[22] Specific Performance <@^16 
358kl6 
Hardship of performance of contract arising from 
subsequent increase or decrease in value of property 
in absence of fraud or bad faith in inception of 
contract is not ground for refusing specific 
performance. 
[23] Specific Performance <@^ =>16 
358kl6 
Courts may not arbitrarily refuse specific 
performance on ground that contract is inequitable 
and unconscionable, or because they deem it unwise, 
or because subsequent events disclose that it will 
result in loss to defendant, but it must appear that 
defendant has been misled and overreached to such 
extent that contract is unconscionable. 
[24] Specific Performance <@^16 
358kl6 
Fact that prospective purchaser was willing to pay 
$35,000 for gasoline station leased in 1939 did not 
render it unconscionable and inequitable to require 
specific performance of purchase option agreement 
permitting lessee to purchase premises for $25,000, 
**709 Syllabus by the Court. 
*292 1. A purchaser may not have the necessary 
cash in hand, but that alone does not disqualify him if 
he is otherwise so situated that he is reasonably able 
to command the requisite cash at the required time. 
2. Generally speaking, a purchaser is financially 
ready and able to buy: (1) If he has the needed cash in 
hand; or (2) if he is personally possessed of assets— 
which in part may consist of the property to be 
purchased-and a credit rating which enable him with 
reasonable certainty to command the requisite funds 
at the required time; or (3) if he has definitely 
arranged to raise the necessary money--or as much 
thereof as he is unable to supply personally~by 
obtaining a Binding commitment for a loan to him for 
that purpose By a financially able third party, 
irrespective of whether such loan be secured in part 
by the property to be purchased. 
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3. Where the purchaser relies primarily, not upon his 
own personal assets, but upon the proceeds of a 
contemplated loan or loans to be made to him by a 
third party, he is financially able to buy Only if he has 
a Definite and binding commitment from such third-
party loaner. 
**710 4. A presumption is merely a procedural 
device for controlling the burden of going forward 
with the evidence, and it has no additional function 
other than the limited one of dicating the decision 
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence 
to the contrary; the very moment substantial 
countervailing evidence appears from any source, it 
vanishes completely, and the case is to be decided by 
the trier of fact as if the presumption had never 
existed. 
*293 5. If the decedent was a party to the 
conversation, then, pursuant to M.S.A. s 595.04, it 
would have been incumbent upon the court to strike 
as inadmissible the testimony of the other parties to 
the conversation who were interested in the outcome 
of the action. 
6. Where any issue is settled as a matter of law by 
the record, the case having been fully developed at 
the trial, this court will determine such question of 
law and thereby avoid the delay and expense of 
further litigation. 
7. It is the general rule that ordinarily the fairness of 
a contract is to be determined in the light of the 
circumstances that existed at the time of its making 
rather than by the effect of subsequent events which 
intervene before specific performance is sought. 
8. The hardship of performance of a contract arising 
from a subsequent increase~or decrease-in the value 
of the property, in the absence of fraud or bad faith in 
the inception of the contract, is no reason for refusing 
specific performance. 
Morley, Cant, Taylor, Haverstock & Beardsley and 
Franklin D. Gray, all of Minneapolis, for appellant. 
T. H. Wangensteen, *294 Frank E. Clinite, 
Minneapolis, for respondents. 
MATSON, Justice. 
Appeal from an order granting a new trial. 
Defendants and William F. Brabetz, now deceased, 
as owners of a gasoline service station in 
Minneapolis, on April 24, 1939, entered into an 
agreement with the Shell Oil Company, Inc., whereby 
they leased the service station to the latter for a term 
of five years commencing September 16, 1940. 
Subsequently the lease was renewed for an additional 
five-year term expiring September 15, 1950. In 1949, 
the lessee assigned the lease to the Shell Oil 
Company, a corporation, plaintiff herein. For 
convenience, the original lessee and its assignee will 
both be referred to herein as plaintiff. 
Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the lease are as follows: 
'15. At any time during the term of this lease, and of 
any renewal thereof, Shell shall have the option to 
purchase the above described premises, together with 
all appurtenances thereto, and all buildings, 
improvements and equipment thereon, for the sum of 
Twenty Five Thousand & no/100 Dollars 
($25,000.00). Should Shell elect to exercise said 
option, it shall give Lessor notice of said election. 
*16. If at any time during the term of this lease, or 
any renewal thereof, Lessor desires to sell said 
property to a prospective purchaser other than Shell, 
who is able, willing, and ready to buy said property, 
Lessor shall to notify Shell, giving the name and 
address of the prospective purchaser and the price 
and terms of the proposed sale. Said notice shall be 
accompanied by Lessor's affidavit that such 
prospective sale is in good faith. Shell shall 
thereupon have the prior right and option to purchase 
said property from Lessor at the price and upon the 
terms agreed to by said prospective purchaser, which 
prior right and option shall be in addition and without 
prejudice to Shell's rights under paragraph 15 hereof. 
If Shell desires to exercise its option, it shall so notify 
Lessor within fifteen (15) days after Shell *295 has 
received from Lessor the aforesaid notice of Lessor's 
intention to sell said property to a third party. The 
right of Shell to purchase at any offered price shall be 
a continuing right during the existence of this lease, 
or any renewal thereof, whenever Lessor, or any 
successor in title, may desire to sell said property. 
Shell's failure to exercise any option granted by the 
provisions **711 of this paragraph shall not in any 
way affect this lease, Shell's rights under paragraph 
15 hereof, or its right to the estate herein created.' 
On August 7, 1950, plaintiff sent to defendants a 
written notice of exercise of the option to purchase 
the premises, buildings, and equipment for $25,000 as 
granted in paragraph 15 of the lease. On August 11, 
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1950, defendants sent plaintiff written notice that they 
(defendants) had a prospective purchaser, Robert 
Grennan, who was ready, willing, and able to pay 
$35,000 for the leased premises, and that they desired 
to sell under paragraph 16 of the lease. 
Defendants contended that plaintiff must either meet 
Grennaris good-faith offer or allow defendants to sell 
under paragraph 16. Plaintiff asserted, however, that 
it had exercised its option under paragraph 15 and 
commenced an action for specific performance. The 
prospective purchaser, Grennan, personally had only 
$100 to apply on the purchase price, but testified that 
he could borrow $10,000 from his father and brother, 
and that he expected to raise the additional $25,000 
from the Pure Oil Company, which, in the event of 
his purchase, was interested in securing a lease to the 
station. Grennan had no express agreement with the 
Pure Oil Company, but had carried on negotiations 
with a rental representative of that company who 
testified that he was reasonably sure that his company 
would be willing to finance Grennan to the extent of 
$25,000. 
In answer to five special interrogatories, a jury 
specifically found: 
(1) That the decedent, William F. Brabetz, had been 
present at a meeting of the parties in 1939 when a 
conversation was had as a preliminary to a renewal of 
the lease; 
*296 (2) That plaintiffs representative had Not told 
defendants, as a preliminary to renewal of the lease, 
that defendants under paragraph 16 could receive an 
offer of purchase At any time during the term of the 
lease, the that plaintiff would have to meet such offer 
if it wished to purchase the property; 
(3) That Grennan had in good faith made defendants 
in offer of $35,000; 
(4) That Grennan was Not ready, willing, and able to 
my said property for cash with the assistance of the 
Jure Oil Company; and 
(5) That the Pure Oil Company had never agreed to 
oan Grennan $25,000 for the purchase of the 
troperty. 
With the aid of the jury's determinations, the trial 
ourt made specific findings: 
1) That plaintiff, by notice mailed to defendants on 
August 7, 1950, had duly exercised the option granted 
by paragraph 15 of the lease and had thereby created 
a contract with defendants for the purchase and sale 
of the property, and that defendants had refused to 
convey the property to plaintiff pursuant thereto, 
although the latter was ready, able, and willing to pay 
the agreed sum of $25,000; 
(2) That Robert Grennan, the prospective purchaser 
designated in defendants' notice mailed to plaintiff on 
August 11, 1950, was not at the time of the giving of 
such notice, or at any time subsequent thereto, ready 
and able to buy the property for $35,000 cash, 
although his offer was made in good faith. 
Pursuant to these findings, the trial court concluded, 
as a matter of law: 
(1) That defendants' notice to plaintiff of the 
proposed sale to Grennan was of no legal effect; 
(2) That defendants had breached the contract 
created by plaintiffs exercise of the option under 
paragraph 15; and 
(3) That plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law and 
was entitled to a judgment of specific performance 
for a conveyance of the premises. 
*297 The trial court, however, upon defendants' 
motion for amended findings (and for judgment 
notwithstanding the jury's answers to the 
interrogatories) or a new trial, granted a new trial 
exclusively for errors of law occurring at the trial. 
These alleged errors consist of: 
(1) The denial to defendants of the right to introduce 
expert testimony that the **712 premises were 
reasonably worth $40,000 in 1950; and 
(2) That the trial court erred in submitting to the jury 
the interrogatory as to whether William F. Brabetz, 
decedent, had been present at a meeting of the parties 
in 1939. 
It is from this order granting a new trial that plaintiff 
has appealed. 
1. In granting a new trial, the district court was of 
the opinion that its exclusion of evidence to show that 
the premises were reasonably worth $40,000 in 1950 
was prejudicial error with regard to the issue of 
whether Grennan was able to command the purchase 
price. Although as found by the jury, Grennan had 
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obtained no binding commitment from the Pure Oil 
Company that it would loan him $25,000 upon the 
premises to be purchased, the trial court apparently 
assumed that evidence of a 1950 valuation of $40,000 
would go to establish or enhance the probability that 
he could borrow the requisite cash. Upon the 
particular facts of this case, in the light of the legal 
principles which control in determining a purchaser's 
financial ability to buy, we must hold that evidence of 
the 1950 valuation was immaterial and that its 
exclusion was not prejudicial. 
[1][2][3][4][5] Rules for testing a purchaser's 
financial ability to buy are not to be reduced to any 
unyielding formula, but must be flexible enough to 
accomplish their purpose according to the particular 
facts of each case. In ascertaining the rules reflected 
by an endless variety of cases, it is particularly 
important to bear in mind that no decision is 
authoritative beyond the scope of its controlling facts. 
Difficulty in both stating and applying the rules stems 
*298 principally from a failure to keep in mind that 
Their purpose~the protection of goodfaith sellers as 
well as of bona fide purchasers, brokers, and other 
persons similarly situated-Is to establish a 
purchaser's financial ability to buy with reasonable 
certainty. A purchaser may not have the necessary 
cash in hand, but that alone, it is recognized, does not 
disqualify him if he is otherwise so situated that he is 
reasonably able To command the requisite cash at the 
required time. On the other hand, the seller is not 
required to part with his property to a purchaser 
whose financial ability rests upon nothing more than 
shoestring speculation or upon attractive probabilities 
which fall short of reasonable certainty. In short, the 
rules are designed to protect the seller by binding him 
to a sale only where there is a reasonable certainty of 
the purchaser's financial ability to pay and, on the 
other hand, to protect the purchaser—and persons 
similarly situated—from a technical, insubstantial, or 
sharp-dealing disqualification. 
[6][7][8] 2 -3 . Generally speaking, a purchaser is 
financially ready and able to buy: (1) If he has the 
needed cash in hand, or (2) if he is personally 
possessed of assets-which in part may consist of the 
property to be purchased-and a credit rating which 
enable him with reasonable certainty to command the 
requisite funds at the required time,[FNl] or (3) if he 
has definitely arranged to raise the necessary money-
or as much thereof as he is unable to supply 
personally-by obtaining a Binding commitment for a 
loan to him for that purpose By a financially able 
third party, irrespective of whether such loan be 
secured in part by the property to be purchased. [FN2] 
Although no precise line of demarcation between the 
*299 application of the second and third divisions of 
the above rule can be laid down for all cases, it is 
**713 clear-in the light of the purpose of the rule-
that where the purchaser relies primarily, not upon his 
own personal assets, but upon the proceeds of a 
contemplated loan or loans to be made to him by a 
third party, he is financially able to buy Only if he has 
a Definite and binding commitment from such third-
party loaner. Even though the third party is 
financially able, his promise is of no avail unless 
made for an adequate consideration. A purchaser 
who personally has little, if any, cash or other assets 
must establish that the financial crutches to be loaned 
him by others are both legally and financially 
dependable. 
FN1. See, Hersh v. Garau, 218 Cal. 460, 23 
P.2d 1022; Hays v. Goodman-Leonard 
Realty Co., 146 Miss. 766, 111 So, 869; 12 
C.J.S., Brokers, s 85b; Garrisi v. Kass, 201 
Mich. 643, 167 N.W. 833; Delaware 
Apartments, Inc., v. John J. Monaghan Co., 
Del., 69 A.2d 242; Espalla v. Lyon Co., 226 
Ala. 235, 146 So. 398; Perper v. Edell, 160 
Fla. 477, 35 So.2d 387; Ramsdell v, 
Krehmke, 95 Cal.App. 195, 272 P. 333. 
FN2. See, Pellaton v. Brunski, 69 Cal.App. 
301, 231 P. 583; Walton v. Hudson, 82 
Ohio App. 330, 79 N.W.2d 921; C O. Frick 
Co. v. Baetzel, 71 Ohio App. 301, 47 
N.R2d 1019; McCabe v. Jones, 141 Wis. 
540, 124 N.W. 486; Suhre v. Busch, 343 
Mo. 170, 120 S.W.2d 47; 12 C.J.S., 
Brokers, s 85b; 8 Am.Jur., Brokers, s 175; 2 
Mechem, Agency (2 ed.) s 2441; 
Annotation, 1 A.L.R. 528; 7 Univ. of 
Detroit LJ. 35-37. 
[9][10][11] In the instant case, Grennan personally 
possessed only $100 of the $35,000 cash required. 
He had no other assets. He was primarily, if not 
entirely in a practical sense, relying upon loans to be 
obtained from third parties. Even if we assume that 
the evidence establishes that he had a binding 
commitment for a $10,000 loan from his father and 
brother, he was still wholly dependent upon others for 
$25,000, or slightly over 70 percent of the purchase 
price. Under the circumstances, he could establish 
his ability to command the requisite cash at the 
required time only by showing that he had a definite 
and binding commitment from a financially able third 
party. This he did not do. In the absence of such a 
binding third-party commitment, he could not 
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establish with reasonable certainty his ability to buy 
through any mere showing that his prospects for 
borrowing money were encouraging by reason of the 
valuation of the property he hoped to purchase. It 
follows that evidence of the 1950 valuation was 
immaterial, and no prejudice resulted from its 
exclusion so as to justify the granting of a new trial. 
As to the credibility of the witnesses on other issues, 
evidence of the 1950 valuation had no material 
bearing. 
[12][13] 4. Defendants, upon the authority of Grosse 
v. Cooley, 43 Minn. 188, 45 N.W. 15, Sherwood v. 
Rosenstein, 179 Minn. 42, 228 *300 N.W. 339, and 
Horrigan v. Saeks, 187 Minn. 115, 244 N.W. 545, 
allege that the jury should have been instructed that a 
purchaser is presumed to be solvent[FN3] and able to 
perform the obligations of his contract. They are in 
error. The limited function of a presumption as a 
procedural device has been pointed out with clarity in 
a number of Minnesota decisions and will not be 
discussed here. [FN4] It is enough to point out that a 
presumption is merely a procedural device for 
controlling the burden of going forward with the 
evidence and that it has no additional function other 
than the limited one of dictating the decision Where 
there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the 
contrary; the very moment substantial countervailing 
evidence appears from any source, it vanishes 
completely, and the case is to be decided by the trier 
of fact as if the presumption had never existed. In the 
instant case, the presumption wholly disappeared in 
the face of opposing evidence. 
FN3. As to distinction between Solvency 
and Ability to buy, see Colburn v. Seymour, 
32 Colo. 430, 76 P. 1058, 2 Ann.Cas. 182. 
FN4. See, Ryan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 
206 Minn. 562, 289 N.W. 557; Ogren v. 
City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 18 N.W.2d 
535; Donea v. Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins 
Co., 220 Minn. 204, 19 N.W.2d 377; 
Koenigs v. Thome, 226 Minn. 14, 31 
N.W.2d 534; Ammundson v. Falk, 228 
Minn. 115, 36 N.W.2d 521, 7 AL.R.2d 
1318; Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 
280, 56 S.Ct. 190, 80 L.Ed. 229; 
Am.L.Inst., Model Code of Evidence, Rule 
704, Comment b. 
[14] [15] 5. Although not urged as error in 
iefendant's motion, the trial court has expressed some 
ioubt as to the propriety of its submission to the jury 
>f an interrogatory as to whether William F. Brabetz, 
deceased, was present in 1939 when the defendants 
met with plaintiffs representative, Eugene W. 
Sandker, to discuss the renewal of the lease. In 
answer to this interrogatory, the jury did find that 
decedent was present, and in answer to a second 
interrogatory it found that Sandker had made no 
misrepresentation to the defendants. If the jury had 
found that a misrepresentation had in fact been made, 
then it would have been necessary for the trial court 
to know if decedent was present, because, **714 if he 
was present, it would then, pursuant to M.S.A. s 
595.04, have been prejudicial *301 error for the trial 
court to refuse to strike as inadmissible the testimony 
of the other parties to the conversation who were 
interested in the outcome of the action. Pomerenke v. 
Farmers L. Ins. Co, 228 Minn. 256, 36 N.W.2d 703, 
and cases therein cited. It follows that the 
interrogatory was properly submitted to the jury, and 
there was no error. 
[16][17] [18] 6. Aside from the alleged errors of law 
which the trial court specified as the exclusive 
grounds for granting a new trial, defendants by their 
blended motion further asserted that specific 
performance of the contract ought to have been 
denied because of inequity and hardship and also on 
the alleged ground that defendants were induced to 
enter into the contract by reason of a material 
misrepresentation by plaintiff as to defendants' rights 
under paragraphs 15 and 16. These additional 
grounds properly relate not to the granting of a new 
trial, but to that part of their motion upon which the 
trial court has not acted, namely, the request for 
amended findings and conclusions of law. As an 
appellate court, we do not make or amend findings or 
even direct that it be done where the facts are in 
dispute. Where, however, any issue is settled as a 
matter of law by the record, the case having been 
fully developed at the trial, this court will determine 
such question of law and thereby avoid the delay and 
expense of further litigation. Long ago we adopted 
the policy of determining the merits whenever it 
could be done with due regard to the limitations 
arising from the nature of our appellate jurisdiction. 
[FN5] 
FN5. Penn Anthracite Mm. Co. v. Clarkson 
Sec. Co, 205 Minn. 517, 287 N.W. 15; 
Dwinnell v. Minneapolis F. & M. Mut. Ins. 
Co, 97 Minn. 340, 106 N.W. 312; Gordon 
6 Ferguson v. Doran, 100 Minn. 343, 111 
N.W. 272, 8 L.R.A,N.S, 1049; First Nat. 
Bank v. Towle, 118 Minn. 514, 137 N.W. 
291; Droege v. Brockmeyer, 214 Minn. 182, 
7 N.W.2d 538; State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil 
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Service Board, 226 Minn. 253, 32 N.W.2d 
583; 1 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp, ss 428, 429. 
[19] As already noted, defendants contend that 
specific performance should have been denied 
because defendants were induced to enter into the 
lease by reason of a material misrepresentation 
alleged to have been made by Mr. Sandker, plaintiffs 
representative, as to *302 their rights under 
paragraphs 15 and 16. The contention is without 
merit, in that the jury upon conflicting evidence has 
specifically found that no such misrepresentation had 
been made. See, Ross v. Carroll, 156 Minn. 132, 
135, 194 N.W. 315, 316. 
[20][21][22][23] 7-8. By their blended motion, 
defendants assert that specific performance in the 
exercise of a sound discretion ought to have been 
denied, because the contract is inequitable and to 
enforce it will result in undue hardship to defendants. 
The inequity and hardship is said to arise from the 
increase in the value of the property and the 
depreciation in value of money Since the lease 
agreement was entered into by the parties. It is the 
general rule that ordinarily the fairness of a contract is 
to be determined in the light of the circumstances that 
existed at the time of its making rather than by the 
effect of subsequent events which intervene before 
specific performance is sought. Adequacy or 
inadequacy of consideration for the property sold is 
to be determined as of the inception of the contract 
rather than according to the increased or decreased 
value of the property at the time of trial. It is 
recognized in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that the 
hardship of performance of a contract arising from 
subsequent increase-or decrease-in the value of the 
property, in the absence of fraud or bad faith in the 
inception of the contract, is no reason for refusing 
specific performance. [FN6] In the Ross case, in 
discussing when courts may refuse specific 
performance on the ground that a contract is 
inequitable and unconscionable, we said, 156 Minn. 
135, 194 N.W. 316: '* * * But **715 they cannot do 
so arbitrarily; not because they may deem the contract 
unwise; nor because subsequent events disclose that it 
will result in a loss to the defendant. To justify 
refusing specific performance on this ground where 
there is no mistake and the contract was deliberately 
entered into, it must appear that the defendant *303 
has been misled and overreached to such an extent 
that the contract is unconscionable. Defendant is 
confronted by the fact that the jury by a special 
verdict declared that her charges of fraud and 
misrepresentation were unfounded, and that the court 
adopted this verdict as a part of its findings and found 
all other issues in favor of plaintiff.' 
FN6. Ross v. Carroll, 156 Minn. 132, 194 
N.W. 315; Pike Rapids Power Co. v. 
Schwintek, 176 Minn. 324, 223 N.W. 612. 
See, Stauch v. Daniels, 240 Mich. 295, 215 
N.W. 311; Bailer v. Spivack, 213 Mich. 
436, 182 N.W. 70; Larson v. Smith, 174 
Iowa 619, 156 N.W. 813; Annotation, 11 
AL.R.2d 390, 406. 
[24] In the instant case the jury, as already noted, by 
its special verdict negatived the existence of any 
fraud or misrepresentation. Under the circumstances, 
it cannot be said that the option provisions were 
inequitable when the agreement of lease was 
executed. 
Defendants cite the case of Willard v. Tayloe, 8 
Wall, 557, 75 U.S. 557, 19 L.Ed. 501, as sustaining 
the proposition that specific performance should be 
denied when through inflation the value of money has 
depreciated. In that case, strict enforcement of an 
option to purchase given in 1854, when gold and 
silver coin was the only legal tender, was denied in 
1864, when depreciated paper currency had been 
made legal tender; But the court did provide that 
plaintiff should have specific performance if he 
tendered the purchase price in gold or silver. In other 
words, the court recognized that the parties at the 
inception of the contract had not contemplated that 
payments might be made in an entirely different 
medium of exchange. There are, of course, a number 
of cases where contracts providing for payment in 
Confederate currency were denied specific 
performance subsequent to the Civil War when such 
currency had become worthless. See, Annotation, 11 
A.L.R.2d 446. Clearly, these decisions involve 
factual situations wholly different from that of the 
instant case, wherein specific performance was 
properly granted. 
We find it unnecessary to pass upon the question 
whether plaintiffs exercise of its option under 
paragraph 15 precluded defendants from thereafter 
exercising any right of sale under paragraph 16.[FN7] 
FN7. See, Gassert v. Anderson, 201 Minn. 
515, 276 N.W. 808. 
The order of the trial court is reversed. 
Reversed. 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Page 15 
Date of Printing: AUG 08,2001 
KEYCITE 
Shell Oil Co. v. Kapler, 235 Minn. 292, 50 N.W.2d 707 (Minn., Dec 21,1951) (NO. 35584) 
Citations 
Negative Cases 
1 Smith v. Bertram, 603 N.W.2d 568, 572+(Iowa Dec 22, 1999) (NO. 97-1772) "" *** 
2 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doerr, 303 A.2d 898, 914, 123 NJ.Super. 530, 561 
(NJ.Super.Ch. Apr 11, 1973) * HN: 13 
Positive Cases 
* * * * Examined 
3 Jones v. Amoco Oil Co., 483 N.W.2d 718, 722+ (MinnApp. Mar 31, 1992) (NO. C9-91-1918) 
"" HN: 2,6,7 
* * Cited 
4 Thoe v. Rasmussen, 322 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Minn. Aug 13, 1982) (NO. 81-701) HN: 17 
5 Halverson v. Village of Deerwood, 322 N-W.2d 761, 768, 36 A.L.R.4th 611,611 
(Minn. Aug 13, 1982) (NO. 48259, 48287) HN: 17 
6 Caldis v. Curtis Hotel Co, 95 N.W.2d 641, 643, 255 Minn. 98, 101 (Minn. Mar 20, 1959) 
(NO. 37521) 
7 Bailie v. Ridker, 81 N.W.2d 798, 806, 249 Minn. 161, 171 (Minn. Mar 08, 1957) (NO. 36753) 
8 Caballero v. Litchfield Wood-Working Co, 74 N.W.2d 404,407, 246 Minn. 124, 127 
(Minn. Jan 13, 1956) (NO. 36581) HN: 12 
9 Kath v. Kath, 55 N.W.2d 691, 694, 238 Minn. 120, 124 (Minn. Nov 28, 1952) (NO. 35809) 
10 In re Amt's Estate, 54 N.W.2d 333, 337, 237 Minn. 245, 251 (Minn. Jul 11, 1952) (NO. 35631) 
lift 
11 Knuth v. Murphy, 54 N.W.2d 771, 776+, 237 Minn. 225, 232+ (Minn. Jun 27, 1952) 
(NO. 35762) HN: 12 
12 In re Estate of South, 1996 WL 438826, *1 (MinnApp. Aug 06, 1996) (NO. CX-96-523) 
HN:6 
13 Century 21-Birdsell Realty, Inc. v. Hiebel, 379 N.W.2d 201,204 (MinnApp. Dec 24, 1985) 
(NO. C7-85-760) HN: 6 
14 ERA Town and Country Realty, Inc. v. TEVAC, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 526, 529 
(MinnApp. Nov 12, 1985) (NO. C8-85-427) "" HN: 6 
15 Dealer's Transport Co. v. Werner Transp. Co, 203 F.2d 549, 556 
(8th Cir.(Minn.) Apr 17, 1953) (NO. 14583, 14584, 14585, 14586, 14587, 14588) "" 
HN:12 
16 ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Alex Cooley's Ballroom, Inc., 726 F.2d 1559, 1561, 
39 UCC Rep.Serv. 62, 62 (11th Cir.(Ga.) Mar 16, 1984) (NO. 82-8633) HN: 23 
17 Richardson v. Buehre, 153 F.Supp. 120, 123 (D.Minn. Jul 05, 1957) (NO. CIV. 1854) 
18 Hollywood Mall, Inc. v. Capozzi, 545 So.2d 918, 920, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1143, 1143 
(FlaApp. 4 Dist. May 10, 1989) (NO. 87-2553, 88-1079) 
19 Imperial Refineries Corp. v. Morrissey, 119 N.W.2d 872, 878+, 254 Iowa 934, 944+ 
(Iowa Feb 12, 1963) (NO. 50799) HN: 4 
20 Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 1377, 1385+, 214 Kan. 22, 31+ (Kan. Mar 02, 1974) 
(NO. 46977) HN: 6,7 
21 Allied Realty, Inc. v. Boyer, 302 N.W.2d 774, 777 (N.D. Feb 24, 1981) (NO. CIV. 9867) 
HN: 1,2 
22 Goetz v. Anderson, 274 N.W.2d 175, 179+ (N.D. Nov 30, 1978) (NO. CIV. 9490) HN: 2 
© Copyright West Group 2001 
p 
Citations 
Positive Cases 
** Cited 
23 Mohrlang v. Draper, 365 N.W.2d 443, 447, 219 Neb. 630, 633 (Neb. Apr 05, 1985) 
(NO. 83-952) HN: 20,23 
24 Fleming Realty & Ins., Inc. v. Evans, 259 N.W.2d 604, 607, 199 Neb. 440, 445 
(Neb. Nov 16, 1977) (NO. 41161) HN: 10 
25 Shumaker v. Lear, 345 A.2d 249, 253, 235 Pa.Super. 509, 517 (Pa.Super. Sep 22, 1975) 
HN: 6,7,8 
26 Gatlinburg Real Estate Co., Inc. v. Booth, 651 S.W.2d 203, 205+ (Tenn. Apr 25, 1983) 
HN:4 
27 Northwest Television Club, Inc. v. Gross Seattle, Inc., 634 P.2d 837, 840, 
96 Wash.2d 973, 979 (Wash. Oct 01, 1981) (NO. 47204-1) "" HN: 6 
28 Record Realty, Inc. v. Hull, 552 P.2d 191, 193+, 15 WasLApp. 826, 829+ 
(WasLApp. Div. 1 Jul 19, 1976) (NO. 3005-1) HN: 6 
29 Peter M. Chalik & Associates v. Hermes, 201 N.W.2d 514, 520, 56 Wis.2d 151, 161 
(Wis. Oct 31, 1972) (NO. 158) "" 
* Mentioned 
30 In re Estate of Beecham, 378 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. Dec 27, 1985) (NO. CX-84-550) 
31 Neubauer v. Cloutier, 122 N.W.2d 623, 629, 265 Minn. 539, 546 (Minn. Jun 14, 1963) 
(NO. 38926) 
32 Southdale Center, Inc. v. Lewis, 110 N.W.2d 857, 863, 260 Minn. 430, 439, 
6 A.L.R.3d 345, 345 (Minn. Jul 14, 1961) (NO. 38168) 
33 Pearson v. Bertelson, 69 N.W.2d 621, 625, 244 Minn. 224, 229 (Minn. Mar 25, 1955) 
(NO. 36481) 
34 Gubbins v. County of Hennepin, 1982 WL 1091, *1 (Minn.Tax May 20, 1982) (NO. TC 
HN:12 
35 United California Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 681 P.2d 390, 440, 
140 Ariz. 238, 288 (Ariz.App. Div. 1 Sep 01, 1983) (NO. 1 CA-CTV 5135, 
1 CA-CIV 5495) 
36 McGill Corp. v. Werner, 631 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Colo.App. Jun 11,1981) (NO. 79CA00 
79CA0875) 
37 Stevens v. Cliffs at Princeville Associates, 684 P.2d 965, 969, 67 Haw. 236, 242 
(Hawai'i Jul 06, 1984) (NO. 8950) 
38 Mucci v. Brockton Bocce Club, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 966, 968, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 155, 159 
(Mass.App.Ct. Jan 02, 1985) (NO. P. 84-109) 
39 Heinrich v. R.L. Oil & Gas Co., Inc., 442 N.W.2d 467, 470, 87 A.L.R.4th 1, 1 
(S.D. Jun 21, 1989) (NO. 16266) 
40 Matter of Frederick's Estate, 599 P.2d 550, 556+ (Wyo. Aug 15, 1979) (NO. 5029, 511 
HN:23 
Secondary Sources 
41 What constitutes financial ability to perform within rule entitling broker to commission 
producing ready, willing, and able purchaser of real property, 87 A.L.R.4th 11 
(1991) HN: 2,5,6,7,8 
42 Comment Note.-Effect of presumption as evidence or upon burden of proof, where 
controverting evidence is introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19, §6+ (1966) HN: 12,13 
43 Change of conditions after execution of contract or option for sale of real property as a 
right to specific performance, 11 A.L.R.2d 390, §3+ (1950) HN: 19,22,23 
44 49 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 399, REAL ESTATE BROKER'S RECOVERY OF 
COMMISSION FOR PROCURING "READY, WILLING AND ABLE" BUI 
BEING "PROCURING CAUSE" OF SALE 
45 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers s 226, -WHAT CONSTITUTES ABILITY TO PERFORM F. 
46 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence s 199, REBUTTING PRESUMED FACT 
© Copyright West Group 2001 
Page 17 
Citations 
Secondary Sources 
47 AIDS AND THE LAW. SETTING AND EVALUATING THRESHOLD STANDARDS FOR 
COERCIVE PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTION, 
14 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 503, 573+ (1988) HN: 12 
© Copyright West Group 2001 
